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Native American Indians' charged in tribal court criminal proceedings are not
entitled to court appointed defense counsel. Under well-settled principles of tribal
sovereignty, Indian tribes are not bound by Fifth Amendment due process guaran-
tees or Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Instead, they are bound by the procedu-
ral protections established by Congress in the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), Indian defendants have the right to
counsel at their own expense. This Article excavates the historical background of
the lack of counsel in the tribal court arena and exposes the myriad problems that it
presents for Indians and tribal sovereignty.
While an Indian has the right to defense counsel in federal criminal court proceed-
ings, he does not in tribal court. This distinction makes a grave difference for access
to justice for Americans Indians not only in tribal court, but also in state and
federal courts. The Article provides in-depth analysis, background, and context
necessary to understand the right to counsel under the ICRA and the U.S. Con-
stitution. Addressing serious civil rights violations that negatively impact individual
Indians and a tribe's right to formulate due process, this Article ultimately supports
an unqualified right to defense counsel in tribal courts.
Defense counsel is an indispensable element of the adversary system without which
justice would not "still be done." Tribes, however, were forced to embrace a splin-
tered system of justice that required the adversary system but prohibited an ade-
quate defense. The legacy of colonialism and the imposition of this fractured
adversary system has had a devastating impact on the formation of tribal courts.
This legacy requires tribal and congressional leaders to rethink the issue of defense
counsel to ensure justice and fairness in tribal courts today. The Article concludes
that tribes should endeavor to provide counsel to all indigent defendants appearing
1. This Article uses the terms "Native American Indian" and "Indian" interchangeably
to refer to indigenous tribal people who inhabit the present-day United States. While it is true
the term "Indian" was never accurate, it has become a term of art from historical use in Federal
Indian law, history, and statutes.
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in tribal courts and calls upon Congress to fund the provision of counsel to reverse
the legacy of colonialism and avoid serious human rights abuses.
"[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries."
- Justice Hugo Black, 19632
INTRODUCTION
The full panoply of rights and due process protections afforded to
criminal defendants in this country do not apply to Native American In-
dian defendants prosecuted in tribal court.3 Indians routinely face criminal
prosecution, incarceration, and receive prison terms-sometimes
lengthy-all without the benefit of defense counsel.4
Tribal governments and, by extension, tribal courts are not bound by
the Fifth Amendment due process guarantees, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel, or any of the Bill of Rights requirements.5 Instead, tribes are
required to follow the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA).6 The
statutory protections established by Congress in ICRA apply only to In-
dian tribal governments.7
Under ICRA, an Indian has the right to counsel in a criminal pro-
ceeding in tribal court, but only "at his own expense."8 The reality is that
most American Indians cannot afford or find competent retained counsel
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("That government hires lawyers to
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indica-
tions of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.")
3. U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI, VIII, and XIV. As explained below in Parts II-III,
inherent tribal sovereignty predates the Constitution and the existence of the United States itself.
Thus, the Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply to federally recognized tribes. See Talton
v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 383-84 (1896) (holding that the Fifth Amendment grand jury require-
ment did not apply to tribes, as the U.S. Constitution had no application to Indian tribes).
4. See, e.g., Romero v. Goodrich, 480 F.App'x 489 (10th Cir. 2012) (challenging a
tribal court order of imprisonment for eight years without counsel); see also Bustamante v.
Valenzuela, 715 F. Supp. 2d 960 (D. Ariz. 2010) (upholding an eighteen-month prison term
based upon a guilty plea without counsel).
5. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978) ("As separate sovereigns pre-
existing the Constitution, tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those consti-
tutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state authority."); Talton, 163
U.S. at 384.
6. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. %5 1301-1303 (1970).
7. The ICRA provides that "[n]o Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government
shall" abridge a number of enumerated rights aimed at protecting individuals facing criminal
prosecution in tribal court. Id. § 1302.
8. Prior to the Tribal Law and Order Act amendments, the statute read: "No Indian
tribe exercising powers of self-government shall- . . . (6) deny to any person in a criminal
proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." Id. As shown below, this provision was enacted prior to Gideon and Argersinger.
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to appear in tribal court.9 This fact is often met with surprise by non-
Indian lawyers and the general public.' 0
Few federal Indian law scholars have recognized the important differ-
ences of federal power over crime and punishment of Indians. Instead, they
have collapsed the analysis of purported federal plenary power of Indian
affairs in civil and criminal matters, without regard to the individual In-
dian." They have failed to adequately decipher criminal law and the dis-
tinct impact that federal power has over the defenseless Indian.12 Indian
scholars and practitioners have also overlooked the fact that, whether abso-
9. See infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., Gary Fields, Defense Reservations: Native Americans on Trial Often Go Without
Counsel; Quirk of Federal Law Leaves a justice Gap in Trial Court System, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2007,
at Al. Quoting a former federal public defender, Fields described what he saw as an absence of
fundamental constitutional safeguards: "The Constitution acts as a floor beneath you that no state
can go below. . . For Native Americans, that floor doesn't exist." Id. (quoting Popko). Under-
standing the reasoning and basic tenants of Indian law that surround this issue, proved to be more
difficult for the reporter. Fields wrote, "[Tihe right of defendants to legal counsel is guaranteed
by the Constitution. But due to a little-known quirk in federal law, Native Americans aren't
assured this protection. That's because under U.S. law, Indian Tribes are considered sovereign
nations and are not subject to all privileges afforded by the Bill of Rights." Id.
11. Some Indian law scholars object to the discussion of Indian civil rights as misplaced
and separate the positions into two groups: tribal rights and individual rights. See, e.g., FRANK
POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERs: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL
LIFE 73 (1995) (noting that tribal leaders must balance respect for individual rights with the
possibility of civil rights suits "grind[ing] tribal activity to a halt"); Carole Goldberg, Individual
Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIz. ST. L.J. 889, 937 (2003) (viewing "the injection of
Anglo-American [individual] rights as a threat to tribal revitalization"). A number of Indian law
scholars addressed civil rights issues after the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, including
one article on the right to counsel. See Robert T. Coulter, Federal Law and Indian Tribal Law: The
Right to Counsel and the 1968 Indian Bill of Rights, 3 COLUM. SuRv. Hum. RTs. L. 49 (1970-71).
There is, however, little else written on the subject of the right to counsel. See, e.g., Nell Jessup
Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 285 (1998). Some scholars fear that discussing individual rights with outsiders allows oppo-
nents of tribal sovereignty to attack tribal justice systems. See, e.g., Mathew Fletcher, Indian
Courts and Fundamental Fairness, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 59 (2003) (citing to attacks on tribal
ability to administer justice in the Violence Against Women Act reauthorization hearings); Vio-
lence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011: Hearing on S. 1925 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 40-41, 51-55 (2012) (reporting minority views of senators arguing
against expansion of tribal court jurisdiction); Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2012: Hearing on H.R. 4970 Before the H. Comm. On theJudiciary, 112th Cong. 58-59 (2012)
(reporting House majority views that tribal courts will not provide adequate due process to
nonmembers).
12. This Article is the second in a series of articles that explores the heretofore nonexis-
tent defense perspective in criminal law in Indian country. See Barbara Creel, Tribal Court Con-
victions and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Respect for Tribal Courts and Tribal People in Federal
Sentencing, 46 U.S.F. L. REv. 37 (2011) (rejecting a proposal to count tribal court convictions in
federal sentencing as a way to promote or respect tribal sovereignty). This Article provides the
history, context, and analysis necessary to question the role of and right to defense counsel in
tribal court. A forthcoming article will explore the right to counsel as a due process requirement
and an examination of the writ of habeas corpus review as the mechanism of justice to protect
Indian civil rights.
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lute or qualified, a "right to counsel" arises from a foreign adversarial
model based upon the retributive justice system.1 3 The United States im-
posed this adversary system on tribes to displace tribal traditional justice
based upon restorative principles.' 4 The displacement occurred without
concern for rights of the accused.' 5
This Article explores the role of and right to counsel for Native
American defendants under the Indian Civil Rights Act and the U.S.
Constitution. In doing so, the Article exposes the potential for serious
human rights violations. The tensions present in this issue negatively im-
plicate not only the individual Indian defendant, but the tribe's right to
define the nature and extent of internal tribal due process.16
An indigent Indian defendant's right to counsel in a tribal criminal
case (whether appointed or retained) has become inextricably intertwined
with tribal sovereignty.' 7 In this context, tribal sovereignty means the right
of tribes to determine their own internal court practices and procedures.',
The idea of self-governance has become the right to not have required
counsel as a matter of right. Tribes and tribal governing bodies viewed this
issue as a sovereign prerogative that may or may not be funded, depending
on fiscal and administrative responsibilities and resources.19 Therefore, it is
simply not acceptable to address the problem by announcing that Indian
people deserve the same rights as a person coming before state or federal
court. While such a stance might be a viable rallying point to ultimately
fight for the right to indigent defense counsel in tribal courts, a sovereign
tribe's right to define due process under the tribal internal system must
also be acknowledged.
The role of defense counsel in tribal court and in tribal sovereignty
must be examined, not only in response to the encroachment of tribal
sovereignty by requirements of a "right" to counsel made by renewed con-
gressional efforts, but also through the lens of tribal values and deeply held
beliefs of what constitutes justice and fairness. Declining to provide coun-
sel for defendants may be an act of tribal sovereignty, but it may come at
the expense of the same sovereign power.
To understand the role of and right to counsel in tribal courts, it is
important to examine the development of the doctrine in state and federal
13. As described in Part II. B infra, the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") created Courts of
Indian Offenses ("CIO courts") to impose the adversary system on reservations in an effort to
bring law and order where federal officials thought none existed.
14. The displacement included the imposition of CIO courts and the Major Crimes Act
as explained in Part II. B infra.
15. The evolution of the right to counsel in American courts described in Part I, infra, did
not include Indian country. Part II describes the background and history of the prohibition of
counsel in tribal courts.
16. See infra Parts III and IV.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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court as a matter of constitutional interpretation as well as the Indian Civil
Rights Act. Only in understanding the differences can one understand the
potential for serious civil rights violations that negatively impact an indi-
vidual Indian defendant, tribal due process, and the public's view of tribal
sovereignty.
The role of defense counsel and the concept of an accused's right to
assistance of counsel developed from English common law and are now
encompassed under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution. 2 0 Tribal courts, on the other hand, have a different relationship and
history under the Constitution, but they are expected to have the same
jurisprudence to be legitimate. 2 1 Despite this requirement, defense counsel
in tribal courts (or the lack thereof) evolved from an elaborate struggle
between tribal sovereignty and federal encroachment. 22 To understand the
nature of the right to counsel, an examination of the right to counsel as it
was presented to Indians and tribal courts from the American colonists is
imperative.
Part I of this Article reviews the historic development of the right to
counsel under the U.S. Constitution. This Part provides a comparative
backdrop and illuminates the nature and impact of the disparities that exist
between prosecutions of those facing charges in state or federal court and
individual tribal members who face charges in tribal court. Part II exca-
vates the historical antecedents to the prohibition against counsel in tribal
court, which is rooted in the federal government's imposition of the ad-
versary system and the creation of Courts of Indian Offenses. The history
follows the tribes' subsequent acquiescence and adoption of the prohibi-
tion against counsel as a sovereign act intended to reject federal control and
reassert control over their own legal systems. Part III shows the develop-
ment of the right to counsel at the Indian's own expense under the Indian
Civil Rights Act as compared to the Sixth Amendment right guaranteed
for all accused under the Constitution. Part IV illuminates the serious
problems for the United States, tribal governments, and the individual In-
dian based upon the separate and disparate treatment of tribal people when
they are charged with crimes within their own legal systems. Failing to
provide defense counsel in tribal court effectively bars access to justice for
Indians in tribal, state, and federal courts. Finally, Part V calls upon tribal
and congressional leaders to analyze the right to counsel as it currently
exists and reconsider their respective positions. The Article proposes solu-
tions that encompass and uphold tribal sovereignty while also protecting
the Native American Indian in the right to counsel debate. Access to jus-
tice is achieved through the establishment and funding of indigent defense
systems in adversarial tribal courts and support of the sovereign right to
20. See U.S. CONST. amends. V-VI.
21. See, e.g., Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211-12 (1978) (sug-
gesting that tribal courts that look like state and federal courts are legitimate).
22. See infra Parts II and III.
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implement tribal justice systems that represents an alternative to prosecu-
tion and incarceration.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT AFFORDED CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS IN AMERICAN COURTS
"Orginally, in England a person charged with treason or felony was denied the aid
of counsel, except in respect of legal questions which the accused himsef might
suggest."
- Justice George Sutherland, 193223
The role of defense counsel in tribal court cannot be evaluated with-
out an overview of the evolution of the right to counsel under the U.S.
Constitution and American jurisprudence more generally. The right to
assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings in American courts has grad-
ually evolved, and it has eventually expanded to encompass the fundamen-
tal role that defense counsel plays in the adversarial system. Such an idea
was grafted from the English justice system, but it took root and grew
based upon the ideals of the American colonists. Under the U.S. Constitu-
tion, the nature of the right to counsel developed to embody a fundamen-
tal character in American law, despite the fact that the English common
law did not support such a lofty ideal.
A. The Right to Counsel Under English Common Law and in the
American Colonies
English common law severely limited an accused's right to consult
with counsel at trial.24 Only parties in civil actions and persons charged
with misdemeanors or petty offenses were provided assistance of legal
counsel. 25 Defendants charged with a felony or other serious offense, in-
cluding those punishable by death, had no legal right to appear with coun-
sel. 2 6 Those accused of felonies could seek to have counsel speak to legal
questions only.2 7 This legal system reflected the common law precept that
23. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932) (describing the practice in English law of
denying counsel to those accused of the most serious crimes).
24. WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT To COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 8-9
(1955); Powell, 287 U.S. at 61.
25. BEANEY, supra note 24, at 8-9; Powell, 287 U.S. at 61.
26. Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections about Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON
L. REv. 181, 186 n.8 (2004) (citing 5 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE *355 ("It is a settled rule at
common law, that no counsel shall be allowed to a prisoner, upon his trial upon the general
issue, in any capital crime, unless some point of law shall arise proper to be debated.") and 3 SIR
EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES *137 ("Where any person is indicted of Treason or Felony, and
pleadeth to the Treason or Felony, not guilty . .. it is holden that the party in that case shall have
no councell")); Powell, 287 U.S. at 63 n.1.
27. Jacob, supra note 26, at 186.
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in serious criminal matters, the defendant should not get away with some-
thing or avoid punishment just because he had the professional service of a
skilled lawyer. 28
Eventually, in 1695, Parliament carved out an exception to allow
counsel for those accused of political crimes. 29 But it was not until 1836
that the practice of prohibiting access to counsel was abandoned and access
to counsel was expanded to permit defense counsel for a defendant
charged with a felony.30
Rejecting the English common law, the American colonies consid-
ered the right to counsel in criminal cases anew.3 ' At least twelve of the
thirteen colonies recognized a right to counsel, at minimum, in criminal
prosecutions involving capital offenses or other serious crimes. 32 Within
this formative milieu, the states adopted the federal constitutional right to
counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment.3 3 James Madison proposed
the current Sixth Amendment in 1789, and it passed both houses with
little or no debate in 1791.34 However, at this point, the Sixth Amend-
ment only applied against the federal government and not the states. 35 In
1868, Congress passed the Fourteenth Amendment, to declare, inter alia,
28. Id.
29. Treason Act, 1695, 7 & 8 Will 3, c.3, § 1 (Eng.). The Treason Act permitted not only
the right to retain counsel but required the court to appoint counsel, not exceeding two, upon
the request of the accused. Id. For more on the background of English law in this area, see
FRANCIs H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1951).
30. Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (citing 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONs 698 (8th ed. 1927)).
31. See BEANEY, supra note 24, at 25 (noting that "[t]he right to counsel in the American
colonies deviated from the English right in certain respects"). In the colonies, a statutory provi-
sion was generally the rule, as opposed to judicial discretion under the English rules. In the
colonies that only permitted the privilege of retaining counsel, however, the colonial courts
seemed to provide no greater protection than the English courts. Id.
32. Powell, 287 U.S. at 61 (citing 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONs 698 (8th ed. 1927)).
33. Comment, An Historical Argument for the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73
YALE L. J. 1000, 1031 (1964) [hereinafter An Historical Argument] ("Madison proposed the pre-
sent sixth amendment in the House on July 2, 1789, and it passed both Houses almost without
debate. It was ratified in late 1791.").
34. Id. See also BEANEY, supra note 24, at 27 (examining that "the data available indicate
that no comment or controversy accompanied Congressional proposal of the Sixth Amendment
to the Constitution, and the proceedings at the three state ratifying conventions in which counsel
provisions were demanded reveal nothing concerning the contemporary meanings of the right to
counsel").
35. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), the Court held that the Bill of Rights
constrained only the power of the federal government. ("[The first ten] amendments contain no
expression indicating an intention to apply them to State governments. This court cannot so
apply them."). Interestingly, it has been noted that "[f]rom 1791 until 1932 state and federal
courts saw practically no cases on the right to counsel." An Historical Argument, supra note 33, at
1031.
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that "[no] state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities" of U.S. citizens, and shall not "deny to any per-
son . . . the equal protection of the laws." 36 The Fourteenth Amendment,
thus, opened the door to judicial interpretation of the right to counsel as a
fundamental human right, and extension of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel protections to state criminal defendants.3 7
B. The Nature of the Right to Counsel in State and Federal Courts
"The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."
-Justice Hugo Black, 196338
In a commanding line of cases that include Powell v. Alabama,39 John-
son v. Zerbst,40 and Gideon v. Wainwright,41 the U.S. Supreme Court de-
fined the Sixth Amendment right to counsel as the fundamental right to a
fair trial.42 While the Constitution guarantees a fair trial through the Due
Proces Clauses,4 3 the basic elements of a fair trial in a criminal proceeding
are defined in the Sixth Amendment, which includes the Counsel Clause:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1.
37. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending the right to a court-
appointed attorney to those defendants facing felony charges in state court who cannot afford to
retain counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (establishing the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel); Powell, 287 U.S. 45 (upholding the right to counsel under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment when the state provides a statutory right to counsel); see also Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1977) (holding that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require
that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the state has
afforded him the right to the assistance of appointed counsel in his defense); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (establishing the right to counsel for misdemeanors).
38. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. For an interesting review of Gideon, seeJacob, supra note 26.
39. 287 U.S. at 64-65.
40. 304 U.S. at 458.
41. 372 U.S. at 344.
42. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
43. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any
person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, 5 1.
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process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the as-
sistance of counsel for his defense."4
Thus, the Constitution dictates that a fair trial is one in which evidence,
subject to adversarial testing, is presented to an impartial tribunal for reso-
lution of elements or issues defined in advance of the proceeding.45 Cer-
tain safeguards are essential to criminal justice,46 and the right to counsel is
one of those safeguards.
The Supreme Court has construed the Counsel Clause to mean that
in federal courts, counsel must be provided for defendants unable to em-
ploy counsel, unless the right is competently and intelligently waived.4 7
Counsel's presence is essential because attorneys are the means through
which all other rights of a person on trial are secured. 4 8 As the Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized, without counsel, the right to be heard
would be meaningless:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no
skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapa-
ble, generally, of determining for himself whether the indict-
ment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial
without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evi-
dence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadnmis-
sible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to
prepare his defense, even though he has a perfect one. He re-
quires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces
the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence,
how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect. 4 9
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court dealt with a defendant's right to counsel.
This was the infamous case of the "Scottsboro boys"-nine Black youths
charged with capital rape charges in Alabama.5 0 Specifically, the case in-
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
45. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
46. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
47. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (citingJohnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938)).
48. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984).
49. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 68-69 (1932).
50. Seegenerally HOLLACE RANSDELL, REPORT ON THE SCOTTBORO, ALA. CASE (1931),
available at http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/FTrials/scottsboro/Scottsbororeport.pdf
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volved an alleged gang rape of two White girls by nine Black teenagers. A
trial of the boys, which began twelve days after their arrest and without
adequate representation or preparation, resulted in capital convictions for
all on trial. In that case, the Supreme Court unequivocally declared that
"the right to the aid of consideration of counsel is of this fundamental
character."51 Powell was the first major case to address the meaning and
extent of the Sixth Amendment right in criminal cases under the U.S.
Constitution.52 The Supreme Court's examination reveals an American
tragedy, reversed only by the Court's affirmance of a due process the right
to counsel.
While limited to the facts and circumstances of the case,53 the Powell
holding took on enormous meaning, prompting the Court to later com-
ment that "its conclusions about the fundamental nature of the right to
counsel are unmistakable." 5 4 Powell did not establish a rule, but as a practi-
cal matter, it began to be cited "as an automatic rule requiring counsel in
every capital case" 55 at the state level.
In 1936, the Court again reaffirmed the fundamental nature of the
right to counsel in another case. Relying on Powell, the Court stated:
We concluded [in Powell] that certain fundamental rights, safe-
guarded by the first eight amendments against federal action,
were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of
law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the
fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a
criminal prosecution.56
Then, just two years later, the Supreme Court injohnson v. Zerbst held that
not only was there a right to retain counsel under the Sixth Amendment,
but that in federal courts, an attorney must be appointed if the defendant
could not afford one. In that case, the Court remarked:
(The assistance of counsel) is one of the safeguards of the Sixth
Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty. . . . The Sixth Amendment stands as a
constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it pro-
vides be lost, justice will not 'still be done.'5 7
51. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Powell, 287
U.S. at 68).
52. 287 U.S. at 65.
53. Id.
54. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343 (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 68).
55. Jacob, supra note 26, at 191.
56. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243-44 (1936).
57. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); see also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329
(1941); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
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In a remarkable departure from this solid reasoning, the Supreme Court, in
Betts v. Brady,58 refused to extend the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of
indigent defense counsel to those in the state courts. The Court decided
that the federal right was not "made obligatory upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment."5 9
However, in Gideon v. Wainwnght,60 the watershed case announcing
a new constitutional rule, the right to counsel was extended to require
court appointed counsel in state criminal prosecutions for felony charges.
There, the high court proclaimed that counsel was a fundamental right,
necessary for a fair trial.6 1
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants
who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal
courts are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and
essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours. From
the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals
in which every defendant stands equal before the law." 62
The Court held that the appointment of counsel for an indigent criminal
defendant was a "fundamental right, essential to a fair trial"63 and that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in a state court,
just as the Sixth Amendment requires it in federal court. 64 The Gideon
Court recognized that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any
person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be as-
sured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 6 5
In 1972, nine years after Gideon v. Wainwnht and four years after the
enactment of ICRA, the Supreme Court extended the right to court ap-
pointed counsel to all persons, including Native Americans, facing the
possibility of imprisonment in state or federal court. 66 The right to counsel
plays an important role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth
Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to
58. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
59. Id. at 465.
60. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
61. Id. at 344.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 335.
64. Id. (overruling Betts, 316 U.S. 455).
65. Id. at 344.
66. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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accord defendants ample opportunity to meet the prosecution's case. 67
Thus, a just system cannot exist without the right to counsel. Because of
the vital importance of assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court has held
that, with certain exceptions, a person accused of a federal or state crime
has the right to counsel appointed if retained counsel cannot be
obtained.68
C. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The presence of a warm body who happens to be a lawyer is not
enough to meet the demands of the Sixth Amendment, according to the
Supreme Court in Strickland.6 9 The Court in Strickland held, "the
[C]onstitution's guarantee of appointment of counsel cannot be satisfied
by mere formal appointment." 70 The Sixth Amendment's recognition of
the right to assistance of defense counsel, including indigent defense coun-
sel appointed by a court, envisions counsel playing a role that is critical to
the adversarial system and its ability to produce just results.7 1 An accused is
entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who
plays the role necessary to ensure that a trial is fair.7 2 For this reason, the
Court has long recognized that the right to counsel is the right to effective
assistance of counsel.7 3 I'n Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court set-
tled the debate regarding the proper standard to be utilized in evaluating
67. See Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
68. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37; Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462 (1938). In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374 (1979) the Supreme Court limited the right to
counsel in trial misdemeanor to those cases where actual imprisonment was imposed (finding
"that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require only that
no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense"). For example, another
exception is that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply to prison disciplinary
hearings. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
69. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
70. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940).
71. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685.
72. Id.
73. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350
U.S. 85, 90 (1955) ("The effective assistance of counsel in such a case is a constitutional require-
ment of due process which no member of the Union may disregard."); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Avery, 308 U.S. at 446 ("The Constitution's guarantee of assistance
of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment."); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
58 (1932) (citing state court cases on effective assistance and time to investigate and prepare for
trial) (repeating the language of the district court to ultimately uphold a denial of the right to
counsel in a capital case the Supreme Court opined, "The record indicates that the appearance
[of counsel] was rather pro forna than zealous and active . . . Under the circumstances disclosed,
we hold that defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense.").
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effective assistance of counsel and formally recognized the critical role of
defense counsel in criminal cases. 7 4
Effective assistance of counsel is not simply a trial right. It also applies
at the pretrial phase and especially during plea bargaining, when most cases
are resolved.7 5 In 2012, the Supreme Court decided two cases, which em-
phasized the importance of competent legal counsel in the plea bargaining
process by informing defendants of plea offers and accurately advising a
defendant of the risks and benefits of going to trial or admitting guilt. In
Missouri v. Frye, the Court held that defense counsel has an affirmative
duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution and that defense
counsel's failure to communicate a written plea offer to his client before it
expires constitutes deficient performance.7 6 The Court took this principle
a step further in Lafler v. Cooper, finding ineffective assistance of counsel
where a defendant was prejudiced by his counsel's defective advice that led
him to reject a plea offer and go to trial.77
Thus, under the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence made applicable to
all state and federal prosecutions, the constitutional guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel applies to all critical stages of representation where the
defendant cannot be presumed to make critical decisions without the
sound advice of competent counsel.7 8 This advice includes the counseling
phase prior to trial, the trial itself, sentencing, and appeal.7 9 Additionally,
the nature of effective assistance of counsel and the critical role of defense
counsel is still evolving. These recent cases clarify the scope of the Sixth
Amendment and underscore the importance of defining "the duty and
responsibilities of defense counsel" throughout the criminal proceeding.
II. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TRIBAL COURT AND THE MYTH OF
THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE
"It is hardly necessary to say that the nght to counsel being conceded, a defendant
should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice."
-Justice George Sutherland, 193280
74. 466 U.S. at 668.
75. Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 11 (U.S. 2012) ("Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.");
see also Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 7 (U.S. 2012) ("[Ojurs 'is for the most part, a
system of pleas, not trials,' . . . it is insufficient to simply point to fair trials as a backdrop that
inoculates any errors in the pre-trial process.").
76. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 9.
77. Lafler, No. 10-209, slip op. at 4-11.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id.
80. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
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A. Background: The Right To Counsel in Tribal Court Does Not Begin with
the Indian Civil Rights Act, or Does It?
As citizens of the United States, Native American Indians are entitled
to constitutional protections, including the right to defense counsel when
facing criminal prosecution in state or federal courts. However, the Indian
defendant is without the benefit of those constitutional protections in tri-
bal court where the U.S. Constitution has no application."1 Thus, the
landmark Supreme Court holdings of Powell, Gideon, Argersinger, and their
progeny, guaranteeing the right to court appointed counsel for indigent
defendants and protecting assistance of counsel at all critical stages in a
criminal proceeding, simply do not apply to Indians in tribal court.8 2
But that is not the manifest injustice in this scenario. The real injus-
tice lies in the fact that the federal government prohibited the presence of
defense counsel in tribal courts from the beginning, when it first imposed
the adversarial system on tribes, and this prohibition has persisted through
time because it is misinterpreted as a sovereign right. To understand the
full nature of this injustice and its development, it is necessary to review
the sovereign relationship between tribes and the United States and to ex-
amine the history and formation of tribal courts under the influence and
coercion of the federal government.
1. Tribal Inherent Power Pre-Dates Contact and the Constitution
Indian nations pre-existed the formation of the United States and the
drafting of the U.S. Constitution.8 3 It is axiomatic, then, that inherent
tribal sovereignty predates the Constitution and the existence of the
United States itself8 4 Indian law scholars have long recognized this princi-
ple.85 Even the Supreme Court, which has never included an Indian law
81. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S.
376, 383 (1896).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Talton, 163 U.S. at 383 ("It cannot be doubted ... that prior to the forma-
tion of the Constitution treaties were made with the Cherokee tribes by which their autono-
mous existence was recognized.").
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity
Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect Of American
Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REv. 661, 683 (2002) ("A fundamental attribute of the sover-
eignty of American Indian nations, including many of its theoretical premises under federal law,
is that the concept of tribal sovereignty predates the ratification of the Constitution and forma-
tion of the United States."); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the
Marshall Trilogy and the United States v. Lara: Notes Toward A Blueprint For the Next Legislative
Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFOR-m 651, 654 (2009) ("It was European
contact and the eventual establishment of the United States, at least under the Supreme Court's
understanding of tribal sovereignty, that disrupted and fundamentally changed the numerous
ancient systems of tribal governance.").
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scholar among the distinguished jurists on the bench, has consistently ac-
knowledged the existence of a separate tribal sovereignty.8 6
The Court's formal recognition of the extraconstitutionality status of
tribal governments dates back to 1896, when the Supreme Court in Talton
v. Mayes declared that tribal powers of self-government do not spring forth
from the U.S. Constitution but from the inherent powers tribes enjoyed
prior to colonization.8 7 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,8 8 the seminal
case announcing the limits of federal review of Indian civil rights, the
Court propounded, "As separate sovereigns preexisting the Constitution,
tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by those constitu-
tional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal or state au-
thority." 89 Thus, the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights do not apply to
federally recognized Indian Tribes.90 As sovereign political bodies, tribes
possess inherent power to determine their own makeup and membership
and to enact and enforce laws within their own boundaries of jurisdic-
tion. 91 Thus, Indian tribes have "retained the right to try and punish indi-
viduals who transgress their laws." 92 The right originates not from the
federal government, but from the tribes' inherent sovereignty.
After the formation of the Constitution, treaty making became the
primary means of handling Indian affairs.93 Treaties between the sovereigns
were nation-to-nation agreements and included recognition of tribal
power and authority to govern the community through local tribal values,
norms, and justice on the lands.9 4 Treaties negotiated between the tribes
86. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 55 ("Indian tribes are 'distinct, independent
political communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local self-govern-
ment.") (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60 (1832)); Talton, 163 U.S. at
383 (holding that the U.S. Constitution had no application to Indian tribes); Worcester, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) at 519 ("The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as undisputed possessors of the soil, from
time immemorial"); see also Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts, 33 TULSA L.J. 1, 1 (1997) ("Today, in the United States, we have three types of sovereign
entities-the Federal government, the States, and the Indian tribes.").
87. 163 U.S. at 385.
88. 436 U.S. at 56.
89. Id.
90. See Talton, 163 U.S. at 384 (holding that the Fifth Amendment did not operate upon
the powers of local self-government enjoyed by tribes). The holding in Talton has been extended
to other provisions of the Bill of Rights as well as to the Fourteenth Amendment. See Santa Clara
Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 56 n.7.
91. See Talton, 163 U.S. at 384 (citing Kagama v. United States, 118 U.S. 375, 381
(1886)).
92. United States v. Bird, 287 F.3d 709, 713 n.5 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)).
93. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 33-67 (1942). The United
States negotiated a treaty with nearly every tribe in the nation.
94. For a detailed account of the complexities of criminal jurisdiction over Indians, in-
cluding the historical development ofjurisdiction and examination of early treaty arrangements,
see Robert N. Clinton, Development of Criminal Jurisdiction over Indian Lands: The Historical Per-
332 [VOL.. 18:317
SPRING 2013] The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime
and the United States specified the jurisdictional boundaries and parame-
ters for addressing unwanted behavior and peoples within the borders of
reservation lands, in terms consistent with international diplomacy.9 5 Such
criminal justice provisions delineated the parties' power to punish wrong-
doers based upon considerations of territory and citizenship or member-
ship of the accused and the victim. 9 6
A treaty with the Delaware Nation was the first agreement negoti-
ated between the U.S. government and the Indians. It included the proviso
that "neither party shall proceed to the infliction of punishments on the
citizens of the other."9 7 Thus, the United States and the Delaware Nation
agreed to refrain from unilateral action to punish citizens of the other's
nation "till a fair and impartial trial can be had by judges or juries of both
parties, as near as can be to the laws, customs and usages of the contracting
parties and natural justice. . . ."
Treaty making became the basis for the primacy of the federal gov-
ernment in dealing with Indian affairs.99 This practice followed that of the
Dutch, English, and Spanish governments in their relationships with indig-
enous tribes in present day North America and continued until 1871.100 In
that year, the House of Representatives successfully included a provision in
the Indian Appropriations Act to end formal acknowledgement or recog-
spective, 17 ARIz. L. REv. 951, 952-60 (1975) [hereinafter Clinton, Development]; this article,
along with his second article, Robert N. Clinton, Criminal jurisdiction Over Indian Lands: A
Journey Through a Jurisdictional Maze, 18 Auz. L. REv. 503 (1976), remains the most compre-
hensive guide on the history of the subject.
95. See Clinton, Development, supra note 94, at 953-60 (1975) (citing treaties).
96. Id. at 953.
97. Treaty with the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, art. IV, 7 Stat. 14.
98. The entire article provides:
For the better security of the peace and friendship now entered into by the con-
tracting parties, against all infractions of the same by the citizens of either party, to
the prejudice of the other, neither party shall proceed to the infliction of punish-
ments on the citizens of the other, otherwise than by securing the offender or
offenders by imprisonment, or any other competent means, till a fair and impartial
trial can be had by judges or juries of both parties, as near as can be to the laws,
customs and usages of the contracting parties and natural justice: The mode of
such trials to be hereafter fixed by the wise men of the United States in Congress
assembled, with the assistance of such deputies of the Delaware nation, as may be
appointed to act in concert with them in adjusting this matter to their mutual
liking. And it is further agreed between the parties aforesaid, that neither shall
entertain or give countenance to the enemies of the other, or protect in their
respective states, criminal fugitives, servants or slaves, but the same to apprehend,
and secure and deliver to the State or States, to which such enemies, criminals,
servants or slaves respectively belong.
Id.
99. Clinton, Development, supra note 94, at 953, 957-58.
100. Id.
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nition of Indian nations by the United States.' 0 The end of treaty making
did not, however, end congressional efforts to secure agreements with
tribes, which were then ratified by statute.10 2
2. The Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts and General Crimes Act
Dealt with Punishment and Process
Overlapping with its treaty-making powers, Congress dealt with In-
dian crime and punishment through a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts
from 1790 to the late 1800s.03 Passed to effectuate movement of non-
Indian traders throughout the territories by establishing licensing regula-
tions and to protect tribal lands secured by treaty,104 the Acts were revised
to define criminal offenses and applicable sentences. They also defined the
jurisdiction over Indians and non-Indians for such crime and punish-
ment. 0 5 The temporary Trade and Intercourse Acts became permanent
with the passage of the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, which provided
the basis of the General Crimes Act or the Indian Country Crimes Act.106
The General Crimes Act expressly granted federal jurisdiction over
interracial crimes (crimes involving Indian and non-Indian victims or per-
petrators) committed in Indian Country. However, it included two impor-
tant exceptions.107 First, the Act did not apply to "any offence committed
101. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006)). "[N]o
Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recog-
nized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by
treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or
tribe prior to March 3, 1871, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired." Id.
102. Clinton, Development, supra note 94, at 958; see, e.g., Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Ex
parte Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 564-70 (1883) (describing the February 28, 1877, agreement
with the Sioux Indians that was enacted after treaty-making ended). In United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980), the Supreme Court found that the 1877 Act effected an
unconstitutional taking of tribal property set aside for the exclusive occupation of the Sioux by
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, requiring payment of just compensation for the Black Hills.
103. Clinton, Development, supra note 94, at 958-60.
104. The first of these acts, the Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indians,
prohibited any U.S. citizen or inhabitant from entering Indian lands and provided for federal
prosecution of any who committed crime or trespass against "the person or property of any
peaceable and friendly Indian or Indians." Act ofJuly 22, 1790, ch. 33, %§ 5-6, 1 Stat. 137, 138.
105. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, %§ 4-6, 1 Stat. 469, 470-73 (rendering it a
crime to settle on or survey any lands secured by treaty for the Indians, and requiring the death
for murder of Indians in Indian Country by non-Indians.); Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, %§ 1-2,
3 Stat. 383 (providing for a federal forum for crimes committed by an Indian in Indian country
for the first time, with exceptions).
106. Clinton, Development, supra note 94, at 959-60; see Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4
Stat. 729. The General Crimes Act is also known as the Indian Country Crimes Act. See Creel,
supra note 12, at 59 n.124.
107. The General Crimes Act provides in its entirety:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general laws of the United
States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and
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by one Indian against another, within any Indian boundary."08 It thus
respected inherent tribal authority over internal affairs. Second, the Act
specifically exempted from federal prosecution any "Indian committing
any offense in Indian country, who has been punished by the local law of
the tribe," or any case where exclusive jurisdiction had already been se-
cured by an Indian tribe.109 These provisions implicitly supported inherent
sovereignty and upheld tribal control and authority over crime and punish-
ment on reservations or within defined Indian territory, especially in deal-
ing with tribal members and internal affairs.1"0 Those coming before the
traditional tribal system would be afforded the protections and procedures
provided for by tribal custom, which constituted the "local law of the
tribe.""'s
3. Major Crimes Act Displaced Tribal Authority over Crime and
Punishment on Indian Lands
The idea of respect for tribal sovereign authority over criminal mat-
ters persisted until Congress seized control over serious crimes on reserva-
tions with the passage of the Major Crimes Act in 1885.112 Prior to 1885,
the federal government had the power to prosecute only those cases per-
mitted under the Trade and Intercourse Acts or rightfully pursuant to the
specific terms of applicable treaties.' 1 3 Tribes handled offenses on the res-
ervation under their own internal law and custom, exercising inherent au-
thority to resolve disputes and to sanction those transgressing community
norms.114
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, except in the District of Columbia,
shall extend to the Indian Country.
This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the
person or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in
the Indian Country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any
case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively.
18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2006).
108. Id.; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1817, Ch. 92 § 1, 3 Stat. 383, 383.
109. 18 U.S.C. S 1152. The deferential reference to tribal law in the federal statutes im-
plicitly supports a respect for tribal court power over members and even over non-members
within the tribal territory.
110. See e.g., Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Ex parte Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 571-72 (1883)
(acknowledging the federal law and policy that supported tribal authority over its own internal
affairs).
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 1152.
112. Major Crimes Act, Pub. L. No. 80-772, 62 Stat. 683 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(2006)).
113. See Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. at 571-72.
114. Though historically underappreciated by the non-Indian observer, Indian societies
developed their own methods and internal societal structures to deter unwanted behavior, to
restore a member after a wrong, and to otherwise maintain law and order. These systems incor-
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Prior to the Major Crimes Act, statute and treaty provisions inter-
acted to uphold internal tribal sovereign authority, as exemplified in Ex
parte Kan-gi-shun-ca.115 In that case, the United States arrested and prose-
cuted a member of the Great Sioux Nation, Kan-gi-shun-ca, in federal
territorial court for the murder of another Sioux Indian, Sin-ta-ga-le-
Scka, on the Great Sioux reservation in the Dakota Territory.1 6 The fed-
eral court found Kan-gi-shun-ca guilty and sentenced him to death. 117
Kan-gi-shun-ca, though, had already been brought to justice for the same
cnme under Sioux tradition." 8 Later, the congressional enactment im-
posed the adversary system in Indian Country and supplanted this tribal
traditional restorative justice.' 19
Upon a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court
reversed the federal conviction in 1883, holding that the federal govern-
ment lacked jurisdictional authority over the crime because it was com-
mitted against another Indian within Indian country. Thus, the
prosecution was exempt under the treaties and the applicable federal law
regarding criminal jurisdiction in Indian territory.120 In Ex parte Kan-gi-
shun-ca, the Supreme Court upheld the limits of federal jurisdiction and
protected tribal sovereign authority to punish offenses within tribal
boundaries in light of the absence of an explicit congressional measure to
the contrary.121
porated tribal values and acknowledged the role of the individual within the whole community.
For descriptions of differing world views, laws, customs and traditions, see, for example, Chris-
tine Zuni Cruz, Strengthening What Remains, 7 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 17 (describing the
operation of native and non-native societies from different world views and in the context of law
and order). See also SIDNEY L. HARRING, CRow DOG'S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVER-
EIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10 n.22
(1994) (citing ten full-length monographs or dissertations on the traditional law of Indian peo-
ple); Philmer Bluehouse & James W. Zion, Hdzhqqji Naat' danii: The Navajojustice and Harmony
Ceremony, 10 MEDITATION Q. 327 (1993) (describing the Navajo peacemaking process of apply-
ing internal law and principles); Ada Pecos Melton, IndigenousJustice Systems and Tribal Society, 79
JUDICATURE 126 (1995) (describing how indigenous law and justice is incorporated into every-
day life and is based upon restorative principles of healing).
115. 109 U.S. at 571-72.
116. Id. at 557-58.
117. Id. at 557.
118. Under the Brule tradition, the tribal council met to resolve the murder, ordered an
end to the disturbance, and arranged a peaceful reconciliation of the families involved through
offered or accepted gifts. HARRING, supra note 114, at 104-05 (explaining that the restorative
process applied by the tribe in the case was just "one of a number of conflict resolution mecha-
nisms available to the Sioux," and was "used only after the most serious of tribal disturbances").
For the murder, Kan-gi-shun-ca's family was ordered under tribal law to compensate Spotted
Tail's family for the loss by offering "$600 in cash, eight horses, and one blanket"). Id. at 1.
119. See Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006).
120. Ex parte Kan-gi-shun-ca, 109 U.S. at 571-72.
121. Id.
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In direct reaction to the Supreme Court's decision, Congress quickly
passed the Major Crimes Act.122 This Act requires prosecution of Indians
accused of certain crimes on reservations in federal court, and fundamen-
tally changed the criminal justice regime for Indians from that point on.123
The Major Crimes Act intruded into the otherwise exclusive criminal ju-
risdiction of Indian tribes, previously circumscribed by geography, tradi-
tion, and culture. 12 4 Thus, Congress extended federal jurisdiction to
crimes committed by Indians on Indian land with the explicit purpose that
many an Indian would "be civilized a great deal sooner by being put under
[federal criminal] laws and taught to regard life and the personal property
of others."1 25 Under the Major Crimes Act, tribal people accused of com-
mitting serious crimes on the reservation defined by the statute are bound
to the federal courts for prosecution and punishment, according to the
laws and U.S. Constitution, including laws governing the right to coun-
sel.126 Once in federal court, the rights of an Indian defendant track those
of all non-Indian defendants facing federal criminal prosecution. 1 27
However, tribal justice systems on reservations suffered. With the
Major Crimes Act, the United States began a wholesale displacement of
tribal governments, governing internal affairs regarding crime and punish-
ment in a tribe's own community. This displacement continues with the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the more recent Tribal Law and Or-
122. FR.ANcis PAUL PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 166
(1975).
123. The Major Crimes Act provides in its main part:
Any Indian who comnts against the person or property of another Indian or
other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kid-
napping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A, incest, assault with intent to
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bod-
ily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title), an assault against an individual
who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson,
burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title within the Indian
country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons com-
mitting any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
18 U.S.C. § 1153.
124. Over time, the Major Crimes Act has been expanded to encompass more than twenty
enumerated felony offenses. Specific offenses under the Major Crimes Act include murder, man-
slaughter, kidnapping, maiming, felony child sex abuse, assault with intent to commit murder,
assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault against a person
under sixteen, arson, burglary, robbery, and felony theft. Id.
125. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1978) (quoting 16 Cong. Rec. 936
(1886) (remarks of Rep. Cutcheon)).
126. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
127. Id. § 3242 ("All Indians committing any offense listed in the first paragraph of and
punishable under section 1153 (relating to offenses committed within Indian country) of this title
shall be tried in the same courts and in the same manner as are all other persons committing such
offense within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.").
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der Act of 2010.128 The Major Crimes Act, thus, began the imposition of
the U.S. Constitution over the Indian in federal court, and the concomi-
tant history of right to counsel included the Indian defendant.
The development of assistance of counsel as a right, however, did not
follow in the tribal courts. Tribal courts, as formal systems distinct from
internal tribal ways of addressing unwanted behavior, represent Indian sub-
jugation in the nineteenth century and the imposition of the adversary
criminal justice system on Indians. First, this happened by the creation of
an Indian police force and the Courts of Indian Offenses.1 29 Tribal police
and tribal courts have never been "tribal." 130 Rather the courts and police
force were sponsored first by the U.S. Army and later came under the
Indian Affairs Department sponsorship and control.' 3 ' After the Courts of
Indian Offenses, tribes formed their own tribal courts as judicial entities
under the Indian Reorganization Act. Under the control of the United
States policy, tribal courts began with the presupposition that attorneys
were not necessary.
B. Imposition of Courts of Indian Offenses and Prohibition Against Attorneys
Congress exercised authority over Indian jurisdiction through the
Trade and Intercourse Acts as well as through treaty making. The War
Department, Department of the Interior, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
also had a hand in dealing with the "Indian Problem."1 32
In the later part of the 1800s, in addition to congressional encroach-
ment on criminal jurisdiction by the Major Crimes Act, tribes suffered the
imposition of the adversarial court system to displace or supplant indige-
nous justice systems by the Department of Interior. The first court system,
128. See 25 U.S.C.A. %§ 1301-1341 (West 2012) (imposing a version of the Bill of Rights
on Indian tribal governments); id. S 1302 (expanding tribal court sentencing authority contin-
gent upon specific requirements of the tribal court, including the right to appointed counsel, in
the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010); see also 18 U.S.C. S 1162 (2006) (granting unilateral
authority to states to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over reservations within their
boundaries).
129. WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN ACCULTURA-
TION AND CONTROl 107-08 (1966). The Indian police force and tribal courts were both com-
ponents of the assimilation plan. Id.
130. See Sydney Harring, Native American Crime in the United States, in INDIANS AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 98-102 (Laurence French ed. 1982).
131. Id. at 101.
132. The term "Indian problem," found throughout the discussion of Indian law and pol-
icy, is used without specific definition to identify a variety of issues (usually from the colonizer's
point of view) in dealing with the indigenous peoples inhabiting the lands that would later
become the United States. See, eg., Northwest Band of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324
U.S. 335, 355 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring) (opining that "[t]he Indian problem is essentially
a sociological problem, not a legal one"); THE INDIAN PROBLEM, H. R. Misc. Doc. No. 149
(1924); see also ROBERT HAYS, EDITORIAUZING "TIE INDIAN PROBLEM": THE NEW YORK
TIMES ON NATIVE AMERICANS, 1860-1900 1 (describing the forty years of news stories in the
paper addressing what was commonly referred to as the "Indian problem").
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Courts of Indian Offenses, began administratively by the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs under a broad but tenuous line of authority.
In 1824, the Secretary of War established the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA) and housed it in the War Department, the agency responsible for the
operation of the United States Army.1 3 3 Congress established the Office of
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in 1832.134 Indian affairs remained
under the War Department for twenty-five years, until 1849, when the
federal government transferred the BIA to the newly created Department
of the Interior (DOI).13 5 The statute entrusted the management of all In-
dian affairs and all matters arising out of the Indian relations to the Com-
missioner and the BIA.13 6 Presumably then, Congress and the executive
delegated federal power over Indian affairs to the Interior and the BIA.
The Department and the Bureau, without any express power or authority,
created the Courts of Indian Offenses.
Courts of Indian Offenses operated to establish and impose an adver-
sarial justice system. The courts were the brainchild of Secretary of the
Interior Henry Moore Teller, a former Colorado Senator, appointed to
the post on April 17, 1882.' Shortly after his appointment, Teller alerted
his Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Hiram Price, of "a great hindrance to
the civilization of the Indians," involving Indian tribal ceremony and cus-
tom.' 3 8 Teller's December 3, 1882, letter to Price called for active mea-
sures to put an end to "the old heathenish dances, such as the sun-dance,
scalp-dance," and other feasts and dances of the same character on reserva-
tions.1 3 9 Describing what he viewed as "wicked conduct" he also de-
spaired of the state of Indian marriage relations, the influence of medicine
men, and lamented on the need to instill private property ownership as a
societal value.140 Teller opined, "It will be extremely difficult to accom-
plish much towards the civilization of the Indians while these adverse in-
fluences are allowed to exist,"1 41 and he set out to abolish Native practice,
custom, and rites through a new court system:
I therefore suggest whether it is not practicable to formulate
certain rules for the government of the Indians on the reserva-
tions that shall restrict and ultimately abolish the practices I
133. See SUPERINTENDENCY OF INDIAN AFFAIRs, H.R. Doc. No. 146, at 6 (1824).
134. 25 U.S.C. %§ 1-2 (2006).
135. Act of Mar. 3, 1849, ch. 108, § 5, 9 Stat. 395, 395.
136. 25 U.S.C. § la (2006).
137. Appointed by President Chester Arthur, Teller served from 1882 to 85. The dates of
Teller's nomination and confirmation are unknown. Past Secretaries of the Department of Inte-
rior, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, http://www.doi.gov/whoweare/pastsecretaries.cfm#
teller (last visited Apr. 1, 2013).
138. PRucHA, supra note 122, at 160; see also HAGAN, supra note 129, at 107-08.
139. PRucHA, supra note 122, at 159.
140. PRUCHA, supra note 122, at 160; HAGAN, supra note 129, at 108-09.
141. PRucHA, supra note 122, at 160.
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have mentioned. I am not ignorant of the difficulties that will
be encountered in this effort; yet I believe in all tribes there will
be found many Indians who will aid the Government in its
efforts to abolish rites and customs so injurious to the Indians
and so contrary to the civilization that they earnestly desire.14 2
In response to this request, Commissioner Price obligingly proposed
the Court of Indian Offenses to "well accomplish the ultimate abolishment
of the evil practices," and promulgated a set of rules for the courts.' 4 3
Expediently approved by Secretary Teller on April 10, 1883, the rules or-
ganized courts and procedure and established a criminal and civil code.14 4
The Courts of Indian Offenses sprung forth within the span of four
months, as imagined by the Indian Commissioner, with the mission to
keep Indians from being Indian. At the same time, the Courts of Indian
Offenses introduced and mandated the adversary system on the reservation
for criminal matters.
As blatant federal instrumentalities, one would assume that the
Courts of Indian Offenses provided a right to counsel at least consistent
with the federal Constitution and provide for Sixth Amendment jurispru-
dence.14 5 In fact, the opposite was true. Courts of Indian Offenses prohib-
ited the appearance of attorneys.' 4 6 The Indian agent selected or recruited
judges from among the reservation Indians.147 When none could be re-
cruited, the Indian police force served as the judge.14 8 Under rules and list
of crimes defined by the Office of the Indian Affairs, the courts operated
simply to achieve their mission as "[n]o lawyers perplex the judges."1 4 9
Unencumbered by defense attorneys, "[n]o guilty party ever escape[d]
punishment on account of a technicality of the law." 5 0
The Indian agent or the selected judge imposed standard punish-
ments, including imprisonment, withholding of rations, forced labor, and
fines.' 5' In 1892, the rules authorized imprisonment of "up to five days
imprisonment for failure to do road work and up to six months for
medicine men convicted a second time of interfering with the civilization
programs."' 52 Thus, the reservation Indian was placed in jeopardy without
142. Id.
143. HAGAN, supra note 129, at 109.
144. Id.
145. See supra Part I.B.
146. 25 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1958) (repealed by 26 Fed. Reg. 4360-61 (May 19, 1961)).
147. HAGAN, supra note 129, at 109.
148. Id. at 111.
149. Id. at 120.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 120-21.
152. Id.
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a defense, which was consistent with the purpose of the reservation and
the court system to educate and civilize the Indian.' 53
The "civilization" of the Indian occurred for almost eighty years
without any regard for the rights of the accused. The Code of Federal Regu-
lations prohibited attorneys in tribal court until 1961.1'5 Moreover, Con-
gress never authorized the Courts of Indian Offenses and did not authorize
payment for the Indian judges until 1888.'ss These early Federal Indian
Courts enjoyed, "at best a shaky legal foundation" based upon this oppres-
sive beginning.' 5 6 Nonetheless, the Commissioner and local Indian agents
established Courts of Indian Offenses in every Indian agency that they
themselves saw fit, with the exception of the Five Civilized Tribes, the
Indians of New York, the Osage, the Pueblos, and the Eastern Cher-
okees.1 5 7 By the 1900s, Courts of Indian Offenses operated in two-thirds
of the Indian agencies, 5 8 and they persist to operate as the law and order
court on more than twenty reservations or Indian trust lands to this day.15 9
The adversary system was a foreign system imposed on tribes. Fur-
ther, it was designed by the federal government to bring about the "civili-
zation" of the Indian.160 The laws designed to stop "heathenish practices"
were met with as little opposition as possible because attorneys were pro-
hibited in the Courts of Indian Offenses. '6  Although judges and police
were recruited from among the tribal people, there was incentive to follow
the system put in place by the BIA and the Indian agent.162 The Indian
153. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F.. 575 (D. Or. 1888). In Clapox, judge Deady de-
scribed and defended the courts as a necessary tool to educate and civilize the Indian:
These "courts of Indian offenses" are not the constitutional courts provided for in
section 1, art 3, Const., which congress only has the power to "ordain and estab-
lish," but mere educational and disciplinary instrumentalities, by which the gov-
ernment of the United States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition
of these dependent tribes to who it sustains the relation of guardian. In fact, the
reservation itself is in the nature of a school, and the Indians are gather there,
under the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and
aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man.
Id. at 577.
154. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1958) (repealed by 26 Fed. Reg. 4360-61 (May 19, 1961)).
155. HAGAN, supra note 129, at 110-11.
156. Id. at 120.
157. Id. at 109.
158. Id. at 109.
159. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.100 (2012) (listing twenty-one such courts currently in existence).
160. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888).
161. See HAGAN supra note 129, at 120-21; PRUCHA, supra note 122, at 159; supra notes
146-152.
162. Clapox, 35 F. 575; HAGAN, supra note 129, at 108-09; PRUCHA, supra note 122, at
160. Since the goal was to educate and civilize the Indian, the incentives were to comply by
foregoing involvement in "crimes" of being a practicing Indian, among other things, or submit
to prosecution and punishment in Courts of Indian Offenses. See also Creel, supra note 12, at 63.
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who resisted was met with more punishment.'6 3 There was no need for a
right to assistance of counsel in one's defense The prohibition against
counsel began with the Courts of Indian Offenses and took hold as an
important part of the tribal system. Thus, there existed no preexisting
"right to counsel" in the new tribal courts created by the U.S. govern-
ment. Tribes extended and continued this precedent of "no right to coun-
sel" in the courts formed by their own tribal governments.
C. Indian Reorganization Act Courts Continued the Prohibition of Attorneys
During the advent of tribal self-determination as a federal policy,
Congress initiated the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA). The
IRA represented the new federal Indian policy designed to reverse the
damaging effects of the termination of Indian reservations and devastating
divestiture of lands under the Indian General Allotment Act of 1887, also
known as the Dawes Act.164 The IRA sought to repair poverty, but it
shattered Indian governments, and lowered morale caused by allotment by
reaffirming inherent tribal sovereignty and supporting tribal self-govern-
ment.s65 Returning to the principles of tribal self-determination and self-
governance, which had characterized the pre-Dawes Act era, Congress
halted further allotments and authorized Indian tribes to incorporate and
adopt tribal constitutions as a way to reestablish formal tribal internal self-
government.166 Pursuant to this recognition, tribes formed constitutional
governments and organized tribal courts as models or replicas of state and
163. See, e.g., Clapox, 35 F. 575. In that case, an Indian woman was arrested, without
written warrant by the Indian police on the Umatilla reservation on a charge of adultery, and
committed to the Indian jail for trial before the Court of Indian Offenses; she was rescued by
other Indians. Those involved in her rescue were prosecuted for a crime against the United
States. Id. Upholding the prosecution Judge Deady found:
But, pleasantry aside, and in conclusion, the act with which these defendants are
charged is in flagrant opposition to the authority of the United States on this
reservation, and directly subversive of this laudable effort to accustom and educate
these Indians in the habit and knowledge of self-government. It is therefore appro-
priate and needful that the power and name of the government of the United
States should be invoked to restrain and punish them.
Id. at 579.
164. Dawes Act, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1928). The Act had the same coercive intent to civilize
and assimilate Indians as the Courts of Indian Offenses of the same time period. Divesture of
Indian reservation lands was promised and protected by treaty. The Act allotted tribal landhold-
ings and opened lands reserved for Indians by treaty or other documents to non-Indian settle-
ment, cutting tribal lands from approximately 138 million to 48 million acres. COHEN, supra note
93, at 216.
165. COHEN, supra note 93, at 395-98. See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allot-
ment, 27 ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 10-18, 63-67 (1995).
166. 25 U.S.C. %§ 476-77 (2006).
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federal courts.167 Any tribe adopting or enacting a tribal constitution had
to seek and acquire BIA approval to do so.' 6 8 Tribes enacting a model
constitution commonly adopted a "Law and Order Code" promulgated by
the BIA, as BIA approval was also required of tribal codes, ordinances, and
resolutions passed under the constitution.1 9 Each constitution adopted
under the IRA contained a provision allowing the Secretary of Interior to
"rescind [any] ordinance or resolution for any cause. . . ."170
Pervasive federal control over tribal governance was achieved through
this statutorily required review and approval. The BIA's practice of formu-
lating model constitutions, codes, and resolutions for passage by tribes cre-
ated a BIA stranglehold over tribal actions.'' Tribes, formulating and
adopting formal governments under the Indian Reorganization Act,
adopted standard constitutions prepared by the BIA "patterned after the
United States Constitution rather than tribal custom."1 72 Emerging tribal
courts followed the preexisting pattern for Courts of Indian Offenses. The
pattern was derived from the Code of Federal Regulations that tribunals shall
enforce the pertinent U.S. statutes, the rulings of the DOI, and any ordi-
nance or custom of a tribe not prohibited by federal legislation. 73 Tribal
constitutions adopted under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 in-
cluded the prohibition against attorneys, which began in the Interior De-
partment's Courts of Indian Offenses and was codified in the Code of
Federal Regulations.'7 4
167. Some tribes had written constitutions, which were adopted prior to the Reorganiza-
tion Act. COHEN, supra note 93, at 128.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 476. Section 16 of the Act provides:
Any Indian tribe, or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to
organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and
bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult
members of the tribe, or of the adult Indians residing on such reservation, as the
case may be, at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the
Interior under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe. Such constitution
and bylaws when ratified as aforesaid and approved by the Secretary of the Interior
shall be revocable by an election open to the same voters and conducted in the
same manner as hereinabove provided. Amendments to the constitution and by-
laws may be ratified and approved by the Secretary in the same manner as the
original constitution and bylaws.
169. Coulter, supra note 11, at 55.
170. WILLIAM A. BROPHY & SOPHIE D. ABERLE, THE INDIAN: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED
BUSINEsS 70-71 (1966).
171. Coulter, supra note 11, at 54-56.
172. KENNETH R. PHILP, JOHN COLLIER'S CRUSADE FOR INDIAN REFORM 1920-1954
164 (1977) (describing how the Bureau "tried to impose rigid white political and economic
concepts in a situation that called for flexibility") Most constitutions contained boilerplate lan-
guage consisting of a preamble, followed by articles which set forth powers to employ legal
counsel, negotiate with federal state and local governments, and regulate tribal lands. Id.
173. BROPHY & ABERLE, supra note 170, at 58.
174. Id. ("[P]rofessional lawyers are excluded from most of the tribunals.").
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Secretary of Interior Stewart Udall finally amended the regulations in
1961 to allow the presence of professional lawyers in the courts of Indian
offenses, based upon the concern that the prohibition might be unconsti-
tutional. The reversal did not affect the more than fifty independent tribal
governments which prohibited professional attorneys in their own tribal
courts.1 7 5 Each of those tribes was free to amend tribal constitutions to
allow or regulate attorneys in tribal courts.176 Again, tribes did so only
with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.'7 7
III. THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1968 AND THE RIGHT TO
COUNSEL DEBATE
During the civil rights era, Congress embarked upon an investigation
into the civil rights of Native American Indians on and off reservation
lands. 17 8 In 1961, the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
headed by Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina initiated a series of hear-
ings and field investigations following an independent report' 79 and a DOI
report'8 0 examining civil rights problems of individual Indians. Congress
struggled with the question of how Indian tribal governments relate to the
U.S. Constitution and the protections it afforded all citizens.' The Con-
gressional investigation reflected the widespread concern that "the preser-
vation of tribal rights and cultures has seemed in some areas to come in
conflict with the constitutional rights of individual Indians as American
citizens."1 82 At issue was the fact that "Indian Tribes are not subject to the
federal constitutional limitations of the Bill of Rights."' 8 3 Senator Ervin's
ostensible objectives were to investigate the civil rights gap for tribal peo-
ple due to the inapplicability of the Bill of Rights to tribal governments.' 8 4
175. Id.
176. See 48 Stat. 984, 987 (1934) (codified with some differences in language at 25 U.S.C.
§ 476 (2006)).
177. Id.
178. The Constitutional Rights of the Am. Indian: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tional Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 1-2 (1961) [hereinafter 1961 Hearings,
Part 1].
179. FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE RIGHTS, LIBER-
TIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (William A. Brophy & Sophie D.
Aberle eds., 1961).
180. TASK FORCE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, A PROGRAM FOR
INDIAN CITIZENS (1961).
181. 1961 Hearings, Part 1, supra note 178, at 1-2.
182. 1961 Hearings, Part 1, supra note 178, at 5 (Remarks of Sen. Kenneth B. Keating).
183. 1961 Hearings, Part 1, supra note 178, at 8 (Remarks of Sen. Frank Church) (com-
menting that the U.S. Constitution does not apply to tribal governments). See generally Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
184. For a comprehensive analysis of the ICRA and Senator Ervin's interests, see Donald
L. Bumett, An Historical Analysis of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act, 9 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 557
(1972).
344 [VOL. 18:317
SPRING 2013] The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused of Crime
Congressional leaders sought to correct what it viewed as a double
standard ofjustice.'8 5 As a result Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights
Act of 1968 (ICRA)' 86 to afford the "individual Indian protection of his
rights as a citizen in the face of tribal practices." 8 7 The Act established ten
enumerated rights "constitutional Rights," mimicking the Bill of Rights
with some important exceptions.' 8 8
185. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS HANDBOOK 9
(1972).
186. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§5 1301-1303 (1970)). The ICRA was also referred to as the "Indian Bill of Rights." See Note,
The Indian Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Status of Tribal Governments, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1343
(1969).
187. 1961 Hearings, Part 1, supra note 178, at 6 (Remarks of Sen. Roman Hruska).
188. ICRA did not prohibit the establishment of religion, provide for an automatic right to
a jury trial, or require the appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases. Specifically, the
Act provided:
§ 1302 Constitutional Rights
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
1. make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances;
2. violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the person or thing to be seized;
3. subject any person for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy;
4. compel any person in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;
5. take any private property for a public use without just compensation;
6. deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public
trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted
with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense;
7. require excessive bail, impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punish-
ments, and in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of 6 months or a fine of $5,00,
or both;
8. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
9. pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or
10. deny to any person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the
right, upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.
5 1303. Habeas corpus
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an
Indian tribe.
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ICRA did not prohibit the establishment of religion, provide for an
automatic right to a jury trial, or require the appointment of counsel for
indigents in criminal cases.'* 9 The restraint in these areas reflected the
need to recognize tribal sovereign authority in due process and govern-
ment. 90 The final version of the Act reflected a compromise between the
original intention to bring tribes fully under the umbrella of the U.S.
Constitution and the recognition of independent tribal sovereignty. Thus,
the ICRA may have "secured for the American Indian the broad constitu-
tional rights afforded to other Americans" to "protect individual Indians
from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments,"' 9' but it did so in
word only. Without counsel to understand the protections afforded and
object to transgressions, any such arbitrary and unjust actions of the gov-
ernment remain unchecked. While Congress explicitly granted habeas
corpus in federal court to remedy violations under ICRA,19 2 it is available
only in criminal proceedings and rendered virtually meaningless without
the benefit of counsel.' 9 3
A. The Indian Right to Counsel "At His Own Expense"
Ultimately concerned with the individual rights of Indians in their
own tribal court systems, Congress enacted the ICRA, but failed to re-
quire the right to court appointed counsel. The right to defense counsel
provided by tribal expense was opposed by the BIA for several reasons,
including that such a provision would be costly to the BIA and that de-
fense counsel would create an imbalance as tribes are not usually repre-
sented and judges are not always legally trained.19 4
In addition, the Courts of Indian Offenses operated to prohibit attor-
neys under the Code of Federal Regulations, which set the standard for the
25 U.S.C. 55 1302-1303.
189. Id.
190. See also AMERICAN INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTs HANDBOOK, supra note 185, at 11. ("In
passing the Act, Congress attempted to guarantee individual rights to reservation Indians without
severely disrupting traditional tribal culture.")
191. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-
841, 5-6).
192. 25 U.S.C. 5 1303.
193. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 62; see also Tribal Law and Order Act of 2009: Hearing on
H.R. 1924 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111 Cong. 162-68 (2010) (written response of Barbara Creel to post-hearing questions
posed from the subcommittee regarding federal habeas as an adequate remedy to protect Indians
from unjust actions in tribal courts and attributing the lack of civil rights cases under ICRA to
the fact that Indian defendants have no counsel to protect their rights); United States v.
Swifthawk, 125 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387 (D.S.D. 2000) (finding that there is virtually no case law
on ICRA). This lack of case law is disturbing given that Judge Charles B. Kornman, author of
the Swifthawk opinion, presides over the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota and
has only reviewed two ICRA cases (using the Westlaw case database).
194. 1961 Hearings, Part 1, supra note 178, at 13.
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BIA and tribal governments to follow. 19 5 The DOI and BIA officials ar-
gued that the presence of attorneys in tribal court would unnecessarily
complicate an otherwise simple process and because of attorneys' superior
knowledge, would likely control proceedings in tribal court.1 96 As a com-
promise, the DOI introduced a substitute bill which provided Indians the
right to counsel, but only at their own expense. 197
Importantly, ICRA included for the first time a limit on tribal sen-
tencing authority. In no event could tribes impose any penalty or punish-
ment greater than imprisonment for term of 6 months or a fine of $500, or
both.19 8 Thus, the anemic view of a right to counsel partially reflected the
norm in state court for misdemeanor charges in 1968.
While the debate regarding tribal members' right to counsel under
the ICRA ensued, the indigent defendant's right to counsel in state and
federal court was still unfolding. Senator Ervin began his investigative
hearings in 1961, before Gideon had been decided.' 9 9 During the seven
years of Senate hearings from 1961 and continuing after the passage of
ICRA in 1968, the Supreme Court had not yet extended the right to
counsel to defendants facing jail time for misdemeanor offenses. At that
time, the Sixth Amendment guaranteed a criminal defendant the right to
counsel in federal court, 200 but that right was not made applicable to state
court trials until 1963; even then, it was only for felonies, not misdemean-
ors.2 0 1 Thus, with regard to the right to counsel debate of the time,
ICRA's provision of a right to counsel at the Indian's own expense was
equivalent to the right to counsel in the states. Tribes were in synchronic-
ity with the state and federal judicial interpretation of the late 1960s and
early 1970s.
Tribal sentencing authority was limited to a maximum of six months
imprisonment, the equivalent of a misdemeanor in state court. 2 0 2 The
states were not required to provide counsel for misdemeanor offenses at
195. Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall amended the code in 1961 to remove the
prohibition, which served no reasonable purpose. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.9 (1958) (repealed by 26
Fed. Reg. 4360-61 (May 19, 1961)).
196. Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall amended the Code to lift the prohibition
against professional attorneys appearing in tribal courts in May 1961. Fed. Reg., Vol. 26, No. 96
(May 19, 1961); 1961 Hearings, Part 1, supra note 178, at 54.
197. Burnett, supra note 184, at 591.
198. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1970).
199. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
200. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
201. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
202. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S. § 1302(7) (1970). As originally enacted, ICRA pro-
vided the following restraint on tribal authority to punish: "[A]nd in no event impose for con-
viction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of
six months or a fine of $500, or both." Id.
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ICRA's passage in 1968, so why should tribes be so required?203 Not until
nine years after Gideon and four years after the passage of the ICRA, did
the Supreme Court extended the right to counsel to all defendants, in-
cluding indigent persons, facing jail time for offenses in state and federal
courts. 204
Unfortunately, after the expansion of the right to counsel in state and
federal courts, Congress undertook no subsequent review of an Indian tri-
bal defendant's access to an adequate defense in tribal court. Instead, in
1986, Congress expanded sentencing authority of the ICRA from six
months to one year without reviewing, assessing or altering the right to
counsel or the resources for tribal defense. 2 0 5 Congress acted to increase
tribal sentencing power in reaction to the Supreme Court's denigration of
tribal criminal justice and failed to apply the civil rights lens of the original
law. 206 It was not until 2010, that Congress reconsidered the right to
counsel for tribal court defendants, and then only to increase tribal court
sentencing authority to a total of nine years.207
B. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 Requires Appointed Counsel to
Impose a Sentence Greater Than One Year
Congress enacted the Tribal Law and Order Act to allow, inter alia,
an increase in tribal sentencing jurisdiction under ICRA in certain cases,
provided that tribes ensure certain individual rights to an Indian criminal
defendant, including the right to counsel as guaranteed by the U.S. Con-
stitution. 208 The 2010 amendments to tribal sentencing authority demon-
203. Indians were subject to imprisonment under the Courts of Indian Offenses. 25
C.F.R. § 11.114 (2012); HAGAN, supra note 129, at 120. In addition, the legislative history
shows that the discussion on the right to counsel did not include a concern for lengthy incarcera-
tion. BIA reports revealed that tribes were not routinely imposing jail sentences. Of the 435
tribal governments supervised by the BIA, only twenty-three had contracts with BIA adminis-
tered jails and nineteen other tribes administered their own tribal jail facility. 1961 Hearings, Part
I, supra note 178, at 247-50.
204. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
205. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(7) (1988)).
206. Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) (finding that tribal courts had no jurisdiction
over non-member Indians who committed offenses within the reservation boundaries); Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (finding that tribes had no jurisdiction to
prosecute non-Indians who committed crimes within the reservation boundaries). These two
decisions were, at least in part, an outgrowth of the fact that tribal courts did not have to guaran-
tee rights commensurate with the United States Constitution. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211-12;
Duro, 492 U.S. 693-96. In response to Duro, Congress amended ICRA to recognize inherent
tribal criminal jurisdiction over all Indians. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. 5 1301(2) (2006).
This amendment was also made without the civil rights lens of protection for the Indian defen-
dant subject to tribal court.
207. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 234, 124 Stat. 2258
(codified at 25 U.S.C § 1302).
208. Id.
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strate Congress's intent to provide enumerated rights and standards to
defendants facing a term of imprisonment of more than one year.209
The Act expanded tribal sentencing authority and installed procedu-
ral safeguards to address lengthy tribal incarceration without the aid of le-
gally trained defense counsel. No tribe may "impose . . . any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of one year or a fine of
$5000, or both."2 10 However, the new law increases sentencing authority
for those certain cases, provided that the tribe seeking to enhance sentenc-
ing authority secures certain rights of defendants. 2 11 A tribal court may
impose a "term of imprisonment greater than 1 year but not to exceed 3
years," if the defendant has been previously convicted of the same or com-
parable offense in any jurisdiction in the United States and would be sub-
ject to imprisonment of greater than one year if prosecuted in state or
federal courts. Specifically, the Act increases the maximum sentence under
the ICRA from one year to three years and increases the maximum fine to
fifteen thousand dollars. The expanded sentencing authority applies only
when a defendant has been provided "the right to effective assistance of
counsel at least equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitu-
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. The Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 changed the maximum sentence a tribe may
impose from one year to three years and increased the maximum fine from $5000 to $15,000,
but only with the permission and approval to ensure that the tribe or tribal court process meets
the extensive requirements. The Act provides in pertinent part:
(c) RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS.-In a criminal proceeding in which an Indian
tribe, in exercising powers of self-government, imposes a total term of imprison-
ment of more than 1 year on a defendant, the Indian tribe shall-
(1) provide to the defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel at least
equal to that guaranteed by the United States Constitution; and
(2) at the expense of the tribal government, provide an indigent defendant the
assistance of a defense attorney licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the
United States that applies appropriate professional licensing standards and effec-
tively ensures the competence and professional responsibility of its licensed
attorneys;
(3) require that the judge presiding over the criminal proceeding-
(A) has sufficient legal training to preside over criminal proceedings; and
(B) is licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States;
(4) prior to charging the defendant, make publicly available the criminal laws (in-
cluding regulations and interpretative documents), rules of evidence, and rules of
criminal procedure (including rules governing the recusal ofjudges in appropriate
circumstances) of the tribal government; and
(5) maintain a record of the criminal proceeding, including an audio or other
recording of the trial proceeding.
Even where all these requirements are met, the "total penalty or punishment" cannot exceed
nine years. If these requirements are not met, even under the 2010 amendments to ICRA, the
tribe is limited to one year and $5,000 fine. Id.
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tion." 212 In addition to affording indigent defense counsel the right to
effective assistance, tribes seeking to implement the greater sentencing
scheme under the TLOA must afford a whole host of additional rights and
safeguards not enumerated in ICRA, including a legally trained judge to
preside over the criminal proceeding;2 13 public access to tribal laws, rules
of evidence, rules of criminal procedure, including rules governing recusal
of judges;214 and a record of tribal criminal proceedings. 2 15
However, as explained above, the Fifth Amendment due process
guarantees and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel have no application
to tribal court proceedings. The statutory provisions of ICRA provide the
sole protections available for Indian defendants in tribal courts. Though
the 2010 Act tried to increase protections for Indians, it failed to do so
because it did not address the underlying issue that there is no right to
counsel. At present, for the vast majority of prosecutions in tribal court,
Indians have only the right to counsel at their own expense, the equivalent
of the English statutory rule after 1836 and the pre-Gideon case law in the
United States.
When passed in 1968, ICRA continued in the vein of federal at-
tempts to mold tribal systems to conform to the adversary system found in
the Western-Anglo criminal justice model. Consistent with the Bill of
Rights, the ICRA afforded Indians guarantees of free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech, freedom of press, peaceable assembly,2 16 and other pro-
tections. It also gave Indians the criminal procedural protections known to
defendants in state and federal courts through due process, 2 17 including a
prohibition on double jeopardy and self-incrimination 2 18 and the right to a
jury trial for offenses punishable by jail.21 9
While the Indian version of guaranteed civil rights mirrored the Bill
of Rights, the notable exception, the right to counsel, is an especially
egregious oversight, especially in light of the purpose of ICRA.220 The
212. Id.
213. The Act provides that the Indian tribe shall,
"require that the judge presiding over the criminal proceeding-
(A) has sufficient legal training to preside over criminal proceedings; and
(B) is licensed to practice law by any jurisdiction in the United States."
Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(1) (1970)).
217. Id. § 1302(6).
218. Id. § 1302(3)-(4).
219. Id. § 1302(10).
220. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Act does not permit members of a tribe to pursue legal action against the tribe
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irony is that Congress investigated civil rights abuses in tribal courts be-
cause the courts did not include the constitutional guarantees afforded by
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, imposed a set of rights, and then failed
to include the one factor that could protect those rights: the fundamental
human right of access to defense counsel.221
IV. FAILURE IN ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN UNITED STATES COURTS
BASED ON THE LACK OF COUNSEL FOR CRIMINAL
DEFENDANTS IN TRIBAL COURTS
The absence of a right to free defense counsel in tribal court harms
the Indian in state and federal court. The Indian defendant suffers dual
investigation and double jeopardy punishment, uncounseled guilty pleas,
and waiver of his ICRA rights in tribal court only to face extensive collat-
eral consequences and direct use of his prior uncounseled convictions by
the state and federal court systems that allegedly uphold the right to coun-
sel as fundamental.
The dual sovereignty doctrine provides for prosecution in both fed-
eral and tribal courts for the same offense. Because Indian tribes are sepa-
rate sovereigns with inherent powers of self-government predating the
existence of the United States, the Supreme Court has upheld dual prose-
cution for the same offense. Under these principles, the Double Jeopardy
Clause is not violated, and the Indian may legally be punished twice: once
in tribal court and in federal court for the same offense. 222 Additionally,
Indians face harsher punishment in federal court because of their status as
Indians under the Major Crimes Act, and the courts have consistently held
that this treatment does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 2 23 Federal
prosecutions can follow tribal prosecution for the same offense, and the
for violating any provisions of the act. In other words, it is a law without teeth, without any
enforcement mechanism. The exception to the rule is federal habeas corpus review for criminal
proceedings.
221. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302.
222. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (holding that federal prosecution in
addition to tribal prosecution for the same offense under the dual sovereignty doctrine did not
violate the prohibition against double jeopardy).
223. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (holding that federal prosecution
presented no equal protection problem even where the federal jurisdiction applied only to Indi-
ans, and non-Indians prosecution in state court resulted in lighter sentence); see U.S. SENTENC-
ING COMM'N NATIVE AM. ADVISORY GRP., REPORT OF THE AD Hoc ADvisoRY GROUP ON
NATIVE AMERICAN SENTENCING ISSUES 9, 17-27, available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/
Research_Projects/Miscellaneous/20031104_NativeAmericanAdvisoryGroupReport.pdf;
Troy Eid, Separate But Unequal: The Federal CriminalJustice System in Indian Country, 81 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1067 (2010); see, e.g., United States v. Swifthawk, 125 F. Supp. 2d. 384, 384-85
(D.S.D. 2000) ("Congress has seen fit to impose altogether different penalties on Native Ameri-
cans .... Thus, Swift Hawk faces up to five years more time in prison and a much higher fine
than a similarly situated Norwegian or for that matter another Native American driving in Sioux
Falls [off the reservation]. This is without taking into account the harshness of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines in their treatment of Native Americans.").
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federal investigation may overlap with that of a tribe's. 2 2 4 The fact that
prosecution in tribal court may proceed without defense counsel also im-
pacts an Indian defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees under
the U.S. Constitution in a subsequent prosecution in federal court. Under
differing tribal laws, the right to counsel as defined by internal tribal law
may trigger whether the Sixth or Fifth Amendment right to counsel at-
taches in a federal prosecution.2 2 5 This allows for overreaching in federal
criminal investigations. 22 6 When tribal prosecution is initiated under
ICRA, a defendant is not entitled to counsel under the Fifth or Sixth
Amendments. 22 7 Under subsequent federal investigation and prosecution,
an Indian enjoys those constitutionally protected rights. However, federal
prosecutions ignore federal constitutional protections by initiating investi-
gation in tribal court and using that information and evidence in the sub-
sequent federal proceeding. 228
Additionally, prior tribal court convictions are routinely used against
Indian defendants in the federal sentencing scheme. The federal sentencing
guidelines provide for a favored upward departure based upon prior tribal
court convictions. 2 2 9 For example, in United States v. Romero,2 30 the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado relied on an allegedly unlawful
prior tribal court conviction as the basis for lengthening a tribal member's
subsequent federal sentence by almost three years. The court cited to the
prior uncounseled conviction to grant the U.S. Attorney's motion for an
upward departure. The court upwardly departed from the applicable
Criminal History Category II to Category VI to increase the sentence by
thirty months. 2 3 1 The federal consequences of a prior tribal uncounseled
conviction are irrefragable and include impeachment in future
proceedings. 232
More disturbing, however, is the federal court's use of a prior un-
counseled tribal court conviction as an element of a federal offense.23 3
Under 18 U.S.C. § 117, a federal habitual offender statute, it is a felony
offense for a person who has had two or more prior domestic assault con-
224. See United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1997).
225. United States v. Red Bird, 146 F. Supp. 2d 993 (2001). For further explanation of the
dual sovereignty doctrine and how it works to the detriment of the Indian see, Alex M. Hagen,
From Formal Separation to Functional Equivalence: Tribal-Federal Dual Sovereignty and the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 54 S.D. L. REv. 129 (2009).
226. Sunfthawk, 125 F. Supp. 2d. at 386-90.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL %5 4A1.2(i), 4A1.3 (2003).
230. 442 F.App'x. 399 (10th Cir. 2011).
231. Id. at 401.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Denetclaw, 96 F.3d 454, 457 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that a
trial court is permitted to use a guilty plea in tribal court to impeach a criminal defendant).
233. The (mis)use of prior uncounseled tribal court convictions in federal court and the
proper constitutional analysis is the subject of a forthcoming article.
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victions to commit a domestic assault within Indian country. The law pro-
vides that state tribal or federal prior convictions are eligible. Two Federal
Courts of Appeals have held that uncounseled tribal convictions, resulting
in incarceration, can be used as a predicate offense under the habitual of-
fender statute. 2 3 4
The issues presented on appeal before the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Cavanaugh consisted of whether the Fifth or Sixth Amendments to
the U.S. Constitution precluded the use of these prior tribal-court misde-
meanor convictions as predicate convictions to establish the habitual-of-
fender elements of § 117. Cavanaugh's prior convictions resulted in actual
incarceration that, pursuant to Gideon,2 3 5 would have been a constitutional
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel had the con-
victions originated in a state or federal court.
The district court, recognizing that the Sixth Amendment imposes
no duty on Indian tribes to provide counsel for indigent defendants, noted
that prior convictions were valid at their inception and that the prior terms
of incarceration were not in violation of the U.S. Constitution, tribal law,
or the Indian Civil Rights Act. 2 3 6 The lower court, nevertheless, held that
the uncounseled convictions were infirm for the purpose of proving the
habitual-offender, predicate conviction elements of the § 117 offense in
these subsequent federal court proceedings. 237
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed, finding the Sixth Amend-
ment inapplicable to the analysis. 2 3 8 In doing so, the court recognized an
inconsistency in several cases dealing with the use of arguably infirm prior
judgments to establish guilt, trigger a sentencing enhancement, or to de-
termine a sentence for a subsequent offense. 239 Ultimately, the Eighth Cir-
cuit dispensed with any Indian law analysis and held that use of such
convictions did not violate the federal defendant's right to counsel because
the federal constitutional right to appointed counsel did not apply against a
tribe. Thus, absent any "allegations of irregularities or claims of actual in-
nocence" concerning the tribal convictions, the court failed to preclude
the use of the convictions to establish the predicates for the 5 117
charge. 240 In a subsequent case, the Tenth Circuit held the same. 241
234. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011).
235. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see also Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979).
236. United States v. Cavanaugh, 680 F. Supp. 1062, 1075-76 (D.N.D. 2009), rev'd 643
F.3d 592, cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012).
237. Id. at 1075.
238. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592.
239. Id. at 601-02.
240. Id. at 605.
241. United States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
1742 (2012).
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The spurious reasoning of the circuit courts failed to take into ac-
count two undeniable aspects of Indian law: (1) the rights Indians enjoy as
U.S. citizens under the United States Constitution differ from their civil
right under ICRA, and (2) tribal sovereign power in crime and punish-
ment in Indian country by federal law and policy. These two aspects taken
together require federal judges to uphold the U.S. Constitution. While the
judicial reasoning turned on the fact that the Sixth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution did not apply in tribal court, the decision should have
recognized something more obvious: namely, that ICRA does not apply in
federal court.24 2
In the American criminal justice system, judges sit as an impartial
observer and are sworn to uphold the Constitution and the law. Thus,
federal judges reviewing criminal convictions, either to enhance sentenc-
ing or as an essential element of a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 117, are re-
quired to uphold the over two hundred years of Anglo-American
jurisprudence interpreted and developed by the Supreme Court and ap-
plied by lower federal courts. The Supreme Court has held that the right
to counsel is guaranteed to all persons accused of crimes in state and fed-
eral courts. 2 4 3 While it is true that those decisions do not apply in tribal
court, they most certainly do apply in federal courts. The Tenth and
Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal shirked their responsibilities to uphold
the Constitution when applied to Native Americans in federal court. The
failure to do so produced the wrong result.
The Major Crimes Act subjects an Indian defendant to federal prose-
cution for serious crimes, but an Indian is also subject to harsher treatment
in state court as a result of a conviction in tribal court. An Indian defen-
dant's uncounseled conviction in tribal court also induces further penalties
or disabilities under state laws. 2 4 4 Currently, both KansaS24 5 and Oregon 246
allow for prior tribal convictions, without regard to the appointment of
counsel, to be included in an offender's criminal history during a subse-
242. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. %5 1301-1302 (2006).
243. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel mandates the provision of counsel to indigent
defendants sentenced to any amount of prison time for criminal felonies or misdemeanors absent
a knowing and intelligent waiver. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); see also Farretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
244. See, e.g., State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245 (Mont. 2003) (holding that prior
uncounseled tribal court convictions may be used in the sentencing proceedings in Montana
courts); State v. Stensgar, No. 14627-8-Ill, 1996 WL 460262 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 1996)
(upholding a state court's imposition of an exceptional sentence under state law based on prior
convictions, including a guilty plea to indecent liberties in Colville Tribal Court). For a chart
detailing state civil and criminal uses of tribal court convictions against Indians, see Kevin K.
Washburn, A Different Kind of Symmetry, 34 N.M. L. REv. 263, 290-96 (2004).
245. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4711(e) (West 2007).
246. See State v. Graves, 947 P.2d 209, 210-11 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding prior
convictions assessed for sentencing purposes "include federal, tribal court, military and foreign
convictions.") (quoting OREGON SENTENCING GUIDELINES IMPLEMENTATION MANuAL 57
(1989)).
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quent state court sentencing. Thus, Indians face an increased possibility of
harsher punishment based on uncounseled tribal convictions.
While it is true that lack of counsel in tribal court is not an infirmity
of tribal courts so as much it is the direct result of ICRA, it cannot be
consistent with U.S. jurisprudence regarding the fundamental right to
counsel to use these convictions in federal court against an Indian. The
result is that Indians are left defenseless in tribal country, and then their
federal rights are violated in the federal court system, when it imports the
foreign judgment where the U.S. Constitution has no application.
It is ridiculous and contrary to notions of access to justice that such
uncounseled tribal court convictions are relied upon in federal court in the
name of tribal sovereignty. It is equally repugnant that the Assistant U.S.
Attorneys seek to distort their own bedrock principle of the right to coun-
sel, guaranteed by the Constitution, in the name of protecting Indian peo-
ple or communities. The line drawn in federal court between individual
freedom and tribal sovereignty has evolved into a perverted view of the
U.S. Constitution as applied only to Indians.
V. RECONSIDERATION OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN TRIBAL
COURT: A TRIBAL AND CONGRESSIONAL IMPERATIVE
Tribes should explore the right to counsel in tribal court, looking at
access to justice and the assistance of counsel as a "fundamental right" in
the adversary system. Tribal traditional systems ofjustice included fairness;
no less should be afforded under those systems that emerged as a result of
pervasive federal control or adopted by a tribe. For congressional and exec-
utive leaders, the role of the government in fashioning tribal courts and the
historical prohibition of a defense should be reviewed as a whole to deter-
mine the response to crime and punishment. For federal judges who sit to
review underlying tribal court convictions, it is simply unacceptable to
dispense with any analysis regarding the uncounseled tribal court convic-
tions and simply point to the fact that the Indian Civil Rights Act does not
require counsel. Justice and fairness in the American judicial court system
requires more in each of these considerations. It is imperative that tribal
and congressional leaders reconsider their positions and take up the mantel
to provide true access to justice through the establishment of indigent de-
fense systems in adversarial tribal courts or support the sovereign right to a
suitable alternative. Tribes operating an adversarial court system should be
required to provide defense counsel, and Congress should help provide
resources to establish this element critical to a functioning justice system.
Those tribes implementing non-adversarial justice systems based on cus-
tom and tradition should be allowed to develop without federal interfer-
ence. In either case, the tribal actions should be respected in foreign
courts.
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A. Tribal Imperative
Though the Indian Civil Rights Act did not prescribe a tribal right
to indigent defense, neither does it prohibit the right to defense coun-
sel. 24 7 Tribes are free to provide counsel as a matter of practice, providing
fairness and justice beyond the limited protections required by statute or
the U.S. Constitution.2 4 8 Citing lack of resources and cost, tribes have
rejected defense counsel's role in the adversary model of justice. Impor-
tantly, tribes did not appreciate being expected to provide those rights
determined to be fundamental by an entity outside of and not subject to
tribal authority. 249 Tribal sovereign authority was undercut and truncated
with the implementation of the adversarial court in the first instance. 250
Once a tribe agreed to accept the adversary system and engage in prosecu-
tions that mimic the state and federal criminal justice system, defense
counsel became fundamental to justice. Without indigent defense counsel,
tribes have only a hobbled adversary system of injustice.
Viewing assistance of counsel through the lens of the foreign criminal
justice system as a fundamental human right is imperative, especially when
that foreign system has displaced traditional justice. Tribes have the oppor-
tunity to reconsider the impact on tribal people and the tribal community
of the failure to allow or provide a necessary part of the justice system they
247. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(6) (2006). Prior to the Tribal Law and
Order Act of 2010, the guarantee of"the assistance of counsel for his defense" existed but only at
the defendant's own expense. Due to the Tribal Law and Order Act, tribes are now required to
provide defense counsel to indigent defendants at the expense of the tribal government in order
to impose an authorized sentence over one year. Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302
(West 2012).
248. Indeed, tribes have always had the right to provide defense counsel in tribal court at
the tribe's own expense as a sovereign prerogative. The problem is finding the resources to fund
tribal public defense. For example, the Tulalip Tribe, a tribe in the mid-Puget Sound area of
Washington provides for indigent defense in their tribal code. See Tulalip Tribal Code 2.25.070,
available at http://www.codepublishing.com/wa/Tulalip/. The Tulalip Tribes collaborated with
a law school to assist in providing public defense. Since 2002, the Tribal Court Defense Clinic at
the University of Washington School of Law has partnered with the Tulalip, Squaxin Island, Port
Gamble S'Klallam, and Puyallup Tribes to serve as their public defender on these reservations.
See Tribal Court Public Defense Clinic, U. WASH. SCH. LAw, http://www.law.washington.edu/
Clinics/Tribal/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). The Pueblo of Laguna has employed, at
times, a tribal public defender to provide legal defense services to defendants in criminal actions.
For a description of the Pueblo of Laguna's judicial services, see Judicial Services, PUEBLO
LAGUNA, http://www.lagunapueblo-nsn.gov/JudicialServices.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
The Navajo Nation operates a public defense system. See NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN. tit. 2,
§ 1991 (2010). The White Earth Nation Rules of Criminal Procedure provide: "[Tihat a de-
fendant has a right to counsel in all subsequent proceedings. . .and if the defendant appears
without counsel and is financially unable to afford counsel, that counsel will forthwith be ap-
pointed without out cost to the defendant," if charged with a crime punishable by incarceration.
WHITE EARTH NATION R. CRIM. P. 5.01, available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/
wearthcode/codecriminalrule5.pdf.
249. Burnett, supra note 184, at 589-90.
250. See supra Parts II and III.
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adopted. It is important to reconsider the background and history that led
to a prohibition of professional attorneys under tribal courts and a right to
retained counsel under ICRA.
Tribes should reevaluate whether defense counsel is consistent with
their justice plan. This means an indigent defense is essential to the adver-
sary system of justice. If tribes have implemented the system, indigent de-
fense counsel is a necessary and proper requirement for a fair and just
system. On the other hand, tribes do not have to implement the adversary
system in all matters. The sovereign prerogative allows tribes to induce
justice and fairness through their own systems.2 51 Should tribes have an-
other system, like a restorative justice system based upon native tribal tradi-
tion or custom or other principles, there would be no need to provide
defense counsel. Instead, tribes should review and utilize their own meth-
ods for restoring the tribe or tribal members to balance. Any arguments in
favor of providing counsel must be responsive to the needs of tribes, tribal
people, and take into account the expense.
Addressing the cost of an indigent defense system is important. One
suggestion is to provide tribal defense counsel through a pro bono require-
ment.2 5 2 Attorneys admitted to the tribal bar, such as the Navajo Nation
bar, are required to accept criminal defense cases and represent clients pro
bono. 2 53 However, in testimony before the Indian Law and Order Com-
mission, Chairman Troy Eid asked the Navajo Nation Public Defender to
comment on this pro bono requirement as a practical solution for tribes.
Kathleen Bowman, the Director of the Navajo Nation Office of the Public
Defender, testified as to the very real problems of effective assistance of
counsel under the tribal requirement. She maintained that she often has to
employ other counsel because of a conflict. 2 5 4 Unfortunately, outside
counsel often do not have the requisite training or advocacy skill necessary
for a competent criminal defense because the practice of criminal law and
Indian law are highly specialized. No matter how competent an attorney
251. The intent of the Indian Reorganization Act was to promote tribal self-
determination.
252. For example, the State of New York recently implemented a pro bono requirement
for all members of the state bar "to address the state's urgent access to justice gap." Press Release,
N.Y. State Unified Court Sys., ChiefJudge Names Advisory Comm. on Pro Bono Bar Admis-
sion Requirements (May 22, 2012), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/press/pr2012_03.
shtml. Rule 520.16 of Rules of the Court of Appeals requires all applicants who successfully pass
the bar examination after 2015, to perform fifty hours of qualifying pro bono service before
applying for admission to practice at the appellate level. 22 NYCRR 520.16.
253. As a general rule, all members of the Navajo Nation Bar Association are required to
accept pro bono assignments from the Navajo Nation courts, including representation of indi-
gent defendants in criminal cases. NAVAJO NATION PRO BoNo R. II, III, available at http://
www.navajolaw.org/2007_- PDF/Bono.pdf.
254. Kathleen Bowman, Testimony Before the Indian Law and Order Commission (Apr.
19, 2012).
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may be in his or her field, there is no guarantee of transferable skills to
provide competent assistance in a criminal proceeding. 255
Furthermore, this practice is only available to tribes with an extensive
tribal bar membership and would not be helpful for the vast majority of
tribes. For smaller tribes, in the absence of a dedicated defense system,
there simply would not be enough attorneys to meet the needs of the
tribal criminal court. 256 Such a requirement reflects the 1880s view of
defense counsel in American courts. 257 During that time, judges expected
that lawyers would represent defendants in criminal cases as a professional
obligation or duty and did not consider payment as necessary.
Instead of a blanket requirement for all members of the bar, a second
option is for a tribe to create a specialized defense bar. Those attorneys
with requisite expertise and experience could be kept in a pool and receive
appointment by the court in criminal cases. Short of providing defense
counsel for every member who comes before the court, tribes could ap-
point counsel for those facing charges with a risk of penalty of incarcera-
tion or simply reserve appointed counsel for the most serious offenses.
Under these systems, however, the question of payment for the attorney
still exists. In addition, criminal defense attorneys require payment funds
for travel, adequate investigation, experts, fees for subpoenas, and other
costs to the attorney incurred as part of the vigorous defense. In the ab-
sence of a fully functioning volunteer criminal defense bar, the question
remains: Who pays?
To solve this problem, tribes should look to Congress. Tribes operat-
ing an Anglo-American adversary system should insist on training oppor-
tunities and funding for court personnel as essential to a just system.
Practitioners, whether lawyers or lay advocates, should insist on access to
justice for all. Indian community members deserve access to an attorney
and appointment of free legal counsel for those who cannot afford an at-
torney. Training, funding, and an independent tribal defense organization
are all requirements of a just system, 258 and all are perspicuously encom-
passed under the federal trust responsibility.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Federal and state courts took the position that they had the inherent power to appoint
counsel for indigent defendants in any criminal case. It was seen as the responsibility of every
lawyer to accept appointment without fee. This was the privilege of being allowed to practice
law. BEANEY, supra note 24, at 77; see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
258. Professional organizations have established clear standards for an effective criminal de-
fense system and the ABA has adopted a number of standards and created a document listing ten
fundamental principles. See ABA, TiE TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIc DEFENSE DELIVERY Sys-
TEM (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal
aid-indigentdefendants/ssclaiddef tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf.
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B. Congressional Imperative
Congress and the executive have a responsibility to review the federal
role in shaping tribal justice and to navigate a solution to address the his-
torical deficiency in tribal defense. The first responsibility of federal lead-
ership is to engage in tribal consultation on the issue. Congress has yet to
undertake serious consultation on the right to counsel; it should do so in
order to assess the needs and rights of the tribe and the needs and rights of
the individual Indian who can be prosecuted in any tribal court for crimi-
nal offenses within that tribe's jurisdiction. 2-9
The nation-to-nation relationship requires consultation between the
sovereign prerogative and the nation. This question of who pays for de-
fense counsel arose in the 1961 hearings, and discussion led to the decision
not to require defense counsel in tribal court.2 6 0 The answer that Congress
ignored at that time should be embraced today. Congress should fund in-
digent defense systems for tribal courts, if chosen by the tribes. Unambigu-
ously encompassed under the federal tribal trust responsibility, 261 Congress
has funded training and access to personnel for tribal courts in the form of
judges, clerks, prosecutors, police, probation officers, and other posi-
tions. 262 Justice requires, at the very least, parity in any funds allocated for
tribal prosecutors and defense counsel.263
Parity in funding between the prosecution and defense is also essen-
tial. The adversary system places the burden of proof on the prosecution to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The system presupposes that the
259. As described in Part IlB, supra, when enacted in 1968, ICRA imposed the first
proscription on tribal court sentencing authority, limiting tribal court sentences to six months or
a fine of $500, or both (the equivalent of a misdemeanor in state court). In 1986, Congress
amended ICRA by the Indian Alcohol and Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-137, 3207-146 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 5 1302(7)
(2006)) to allow harsher penalties of up to one year imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. There was
no change in the right to counsel provision until 2010. Id. 5 1302(6). From 1968 until 2010,
ICRA provided for the Indian, "at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his
defense." Id. In 2010, Congress expanded tribal sentencing power to include a potential to
impose up to three years in prison, and fines of $15,000, or both, provided certain rights and
requirements are met. Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, 5 234, 124 Stat.
2258 (codified at 25 U.S.C 5 1302). The TLOA authorized the power to stack individual three
year sentences up to a maximum of nine years, again only if the rights and requirements are met.
Id.
260. 1961 Hearings, Part 1, supra note 178, at 13, 54.
261. For an overview of the federal trust responsibility in Indian law, see generally, Co-
HEN, supra note 93; Reid Payton Chambers,Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1213, 1214 n.8 (1975).
262. 42 U.S.C. 5 37 9 6gg-1(a) (regarding funding to Indian tribal government to develop
and strengthen law enforcement and prosecution in the context of combatting crimes of violence
against women).
263. One of the fundamental principles of a just public defense system is parity. See ABA,
supra note 258, at 1 ("There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecution with respect
to resources and defense counsel is include as an equal partner in the justice system.").
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two opposing sides will have access to information, including the investi-
gation and evidence culled by the government. In addition, the defense
must have access to its own independent research, investigation, and ex-
perts to refute the evidence of guilt offered by the prosecution. 2 6 4 A study
to determine the resources made available to tribal court systems, includ-
ing funding for tribal police, judges, personnel, and jails over the years,
without the requisite funding for a defense bar, is an essential starting
point. A portion of past funding should be allocated to those tribes who
seek to implement indigent defense system as a necessary part of their tri-
bal court system.
In addition to consultation, congressional, and executive leaders
should endeavor to create and staff a tribal liaison to serve between the
Office of the Federal Public Defender (FPD) and Indian tribes. The FPD
is the office responsible for indigent defense in federal courts under 18
U.S.C. § 3006a. The court appoints the FPD to represent Indians facing
federal criminal charges under the Major Crimes Act, yet there is no com-
munication or coordination between tribal leaders and the federal courts.
There is a tribal liaison in the Office of the United States Attorney de-
signed to serve the prosecution, yet no one is provided to assist the tribe
and Indian community in defense.265
Justice, fairness, and judicial economy in the federal system require
the creation of a dual and successive prosecution policy to establish guide-
lines for prosecutorial discretion in determining where to bring a prosecu-
tion.2 6 6 Through implementation of a "Petite" policy, tribes and the
federal government can enter into a true partnership. This would author-
ize the two sovereigns to decide and determine at the outset whether a
particular case will be prosecuted in federal court and allow Indians to have
access to the full panoply of rights afforded them under the Constitution.
The support and furtherance of tribal sovereignty is met with a proviso
that tribal traditional values and practices can be considered in the federal
sentencing phase. In the alternative, forgoing federal prosecution and pro-
viding the tribe the resources to investigate and prosecute an individual
under the tribal adversary system can allow for creative approach to dealing
264. Id.
265. Section 213 of the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 amended the Indian Law En-
forcement Reform Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2814 (2006) to require the U.S. Attorney for each
district that includes Indian country to "appoint no less than 1 assistant United States Attorney to
serve as tribal liaison for the district." 25 U.S.C.A. § 2810(a) (West 2012). The law established
purpose and duties of the Tribal Liaison and also authorized and encouraged the appointment of
a Special U.S. Attorney to prosecute crimes in Indian Country. Tribal Law and Order Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-211, § 213, 124 Stat. 2258 (codified at 25 U.S.C § 1302).
266. The U.S. Attorney's office has long had a policy that precludes the initiation or con-
tinuation of a federal prosecution after a prior state or federal prosecution based on the same or
similar acts. U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE UNITED STATES AT ORNEYS' MANUAL S 9-2.031. It is also
known as the "Petite" policy. See Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529 (1960); Barbara Creel,
Respect for Tribal Courts, 46 U.S.F. L. REv. 37, 90-91 (2012).
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with the Indian defendant at sentencing. The tribal liaison and a tribal
"Petite" policy can work in tandem toward the worthy goals ofjustice and
fairness in both systems.
CONCLUSION
The lack of defense counsel in tribal courts arises from the historical
imposition of a foreign system that displaced sovereign forms of inherent
justice. As such, the issue is inextricably entangled with tribal sovereignty
and the sovereign right to determine due process. These issues that tribes
see as a sovereign prerogative have broad, and sometimes devastating, im-
pacts on individual Indians and their civil rights. The magnitude of the
challenges has yet to be met by the measure of our actions to solve them.
Sovereignty is what sovereignty does. Acting out of sovereign right to
withhold an adequate defense impacts tribal members' individual rights
and a tribe's overall sovereign goals in the tribal court and beyond. Explor-
ing this issue leads to specialized factors, the balancing of interests, and
resource allocation issues of impoverished nations. Revisiting the role of
counsel in tribal courts provides an opportunity to strengthen sovereign
interests by protecting distinct rights.
Tribes have an obligation to review the role of counsel in tribal
courts and history of the right in the adversary system. With the history at
hand, tribes now have an opportunity to undertake a review of their own
values regarding defense, imprisonment, and fairness in light of the federal
government's prohibition of counsel and use of prior uncounseled convic-
tions. In light of the trust responsibility and the fundamental human rights
at stake, Congress should undertake to directly fund tribal defense systems.
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